Spatial aspects of the labor market by Assmann, Franziska
Spatial Aspects of the Labor Market
Dissertation zur Erlangung des Grades eines
Doktors der Wirtschaftswissenschaft
eingereicht an der Fakulta¨t fu¨r
Wirtschaftswissenschaften
der Universita¨t Regensburg
Vorgelegt von:
Franziska Assmann
(Geb. Hawranek)
Berichterstatter:
Prof. Gabriel S. Lee, PhD., Universita¨t Regensburg
Prof. Dr. Andrea Weber, Wirtschaftsuniversita¨t Wien
Tag der Disputation:
1. Juli 2016

Abstract
Spatial Aspects of the Labor Market
by Franziska Assmann (ne´e Hawranek)
This thesis discusses spatial aspects of the labor market. I analyze the interplay of spa-
tial location of residential location and the labor market as well as a policy designed to
affect individuals’ residential distribution throughout space.
Chapter 2 addresses the question whether migrants earn less than Germans due to spe-
cific residential locations. I examine the role of residential segregation on wage differen-
tials using panel and cross sectional regression analysis. In contrast to previous findings
on the topic, I find no negative correlation of migrants’ concentration in city districts
with individual wages. Rather, the correlation is slightly positive. A possible driver for
this positive relationship are networks based on residential locations which facilitate the
integration into the German labor market. Chapter 3 analyzes the existence of infor-
mal job market networks based on residential location networks. For our analysis we
use a geo-coded employer-employee data set consisting of the universe of workers in the
Rhine-Ruhr metropolitan area in 2008. We show that living in the same neighborhood
(defined as a 500×500m grid cell) increases the probability of working in the same firm
by 30%. The finding is robust to several other specifications such as reverse causality,
sorting and clustering close to central business districts.
In chapter 4 I analyze how a spatial policy affects outcomes on the labor market. Namely,
we analyze how a partly withdrawal of commuting subsidies affects individual wages.
Using a large and unique geo-coded data set including exact route commuting distances,
we find that net wage losses are only compensated to a small extent. While the pol-
icy design before the withdrawal is regressive, the introduction of a lower bound on
commuting subsidies leads to a more equal distribution of tax savings.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
One strand of economic literature suggests that due to new technologies and globaliza-
tion, space and its associated limitations for our economy are part of the past. Another
strand of literature emphasizes the ongoing importance of localities and even speaks of
“glocalization” (Robertson, 1995). As long as people work and live in different locations
and markets respond to the attributes of their location, it is important to study the spa-
tial implications for the labor market (Bartik and Randall, 2006). In case of job search,
this is most obvious. Analyzing labor markets and their regional aspects incorporates
the interaction between peoples’ residential location as well as their job location on the
one hand. On the other hand, institutions and characteristics generate or reinforce this
spatial distribution of households and firms (Bartik and Randall, 2006). Especially to
design policies on the optimal spatial distribution it is crucial to understand the influ-
ence and mechanisms behind people’s distribution on their labor market outcomes.
In this thesis, I discuss all of these three key aspects which combine regional and labor
market economics: First, I analyze how residential location affects labor market out-
comes, namely how residential segregation is related to wage differentials of migrants
and Germans. Second, I investigate labor market networks based on residential location
as a mechanism which can lead to the aforementioned interplay of residential location
and labor market outcomes. Third, I evaluate a policy designed to affect the spatial
distribution of people throughout space: A commuting subsidy.
In Chapter 21 I analyze the relationship of migrants’ residential segregation on wages in
German cities. Cutler and Glaeser (1997) show that blacks residing in highly segregated
neighborhoods are worse off in terms of educational attainment, employment and single
parenthood. They find, however, that controlling for exposure to college-educated neigh-
bors explains half of the impact on residential segregation. Collins and Margo (2000)
show that this has not always been the case. Using Census data from 1940 to 1980,
1Chapter 2 consists of Hawranek (2014).
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they find that the negative effects of segregation on black’s socioeconomic and economic
outcomes emerge only in the beginning of 1970, whereas there is no effect before that.
Cutler et al. (2008) investigate the effect of segregation on educational and economic
outcomes of young immigrants to the United States. They find a significant negative
effect of neighborhood’s segregation level on earnings. As group share on MSA level has
a c.p. positive effect, the authors conclude that only an increase in tract level concen-
tration not related to the overall MSA share leads to negative economic outcomes.
Glitz (2014) analyzes segregation of ethnic minorities in Germany both in workplaces
and residential location from 1975 to 2008. His results suggest that segregation is rather
stable in Germany but more pronounced for low-educated people. Additionally he shows
that the longer migrants stay in Germany as their host country, the less they tend to
work in segregated workplaces. In contrast to my work, he analyzes Germany as a whole
and uses municipalities as smallest geographical unit, as opposed to analyzing particular
cities. Glitz finds an insignificant negative relationship between residential segregation
indices (computed for different ethnic groups of migrants) and average monthly income.
To examine this ambiguous relationship of residential segregation on wages in Germany,
I use individual data for a 2% random sample of German employees subject to social
security. The data extend from 1998 to 2007 on a quarterly basis for five big German
cities (Berlin, Hamburg, Frankfurt/Main, Munich and Stuttgart). I apply a panel fixed
effects model in the virtue of Cutler and Glaeser (1997) to determine the effect of high
concentration of foreigners on wages. I find a positive correlation between the propor-
tion of foreigners in one’s neighborhood on wages but a negative wage effect of being
foreigner as opposed to German. Second, I apply a city level cross sectional estimation
additionally including measures for educational exposure and segregation by income as
suggested by Cutler et al. (2008). I test the hypothesis that the latter two effects lead to
the main variation in wages as opposed to residential segregation. The hypothesis can
be rejected, as my results suggest that educational exposure and income segregation do
not significantly influence foreigners’ earnings.
In summary, the empirical results suggest a positive correlation of migrant concentration
in residential districts and wages. Foreigners hence seem to benefit from higher migrant
concentrations in their districts or cities, respectively. There are two main explanations
to this finding: First, the correlation could be driven by network effects on the basis of
residential locations, which help foreigners to find a (well-paid) job. Second, there could
be a correlation in unobservables, which drive both individual incomes and residential
location. The results are likely to be biased by self-selection, which is not accounted for
properly in chapter 2.
In addition to the econometric concerns, the definition of neighborhood used in chap-
ter 2 is very broad due to data restrictions and privacy regulations: To observe effects
from living in a specific area, the definition of this district is crucial. As the districts in
2
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the sample encompass very different areas like “Berlin Mitte” but also “Munich City”,
the classification within cities varies strongly in its acuteness and extend. Results can
therefore only give a hint on the importance of inner city inequalities. This emphasizes
the importance of data with precise neighborhood definitions and exact geographical
information.
Although the evidence of chapter 2 is not completely convincing, Edin et al. (2003) also
find that immigrants benefit from living in ethnic enclaves using Swedish data on a pol-
icy which randomly assigned migrants to counties all over Sweden. Especially low-skilled
migrants experience wage increases which are even higher when exposed to higher skilled
migrants. They conclude that these results can be explained by job search networks.
Chapter 32 examines the existence of such labor market networks based on residential
location. We use a novel data set covering geocoded record data for the entire working
population (liable to social security) and the corresponding establishments. Data on
the exact residential location enables us to apply a precise definition of neighborhoods,
defined by grid cells of 500m×500m. This size is sufficiently small to refer on social
interaction.
We use a well-established approach for approximation of a local network effect: We
estimate the propensity of two individuals to work at the same place when residing
in the same neighborhood. We apply a linear probability model (LPM), and compare
the propensity of two individuals residing in adjacent neighborhoods, conditional on a
super-neighborhood fixed effect (where super-neighborhoods are all adjacent neighbor-
hood grid cells). The empirical design follows Bayer et al. (2008) and our results are very
similar: Bayer et al. (2008) find that sharing the same immediate neighborhood raises
the propensity to work together by 0.12 percentage points, whereas the effect is 0.14
percentage points in our case. This translates into a relative increase in the probability
of working in the same neighborhood of 8%. When estimating the propensity to work
in the same firm, we even find an increase in probability of about 30%.
We conduct a number of robustness checks and rule out several alternative explanations
for this propensity effect. In particular, we test for a reverse direction of housing refer-
rals amongst coworkers and the spurious correlation due to the geography of workplaces
and transportation infrastructure. We therefore explicitly address the main caveats of
chapter 2, the inaccuracy of neighborhood definition and the potential bias due to self-
selection.
We differentiate job referral effects by characteristics such as education, industry, na-
tionality or age groups. The effects differ especially by ethnicity: Compared to Germans,
the propensity to work together is highly increased, in particular for immigrants from
new EU countries but also from the former guest-worker countries Spain and Italy. This
result reinforces the interpretation of chapter 2, where I conclude that migrants’ wages
2Chapter 3 is based on Hawranek and Schanne (2015).
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increase with a higher concentration of other migrants in their neighborhood.
Chapter 3 corrects for the main short comings of chapter 2: First, I use geocoded record
data with small grid cells as neighborhood definitions. In this case, comparison is possi-
ble as all neighborhoods have equal size which is small enough to actually capture social
interaction and therefore allow for inference from residential location on individual labor
market outcomes.
We show that residence based networks play an important role, especially for low skilled
and minority workers. Moreover, the effect of residence based networks can have im-
portant implications for spatially based policies: If networks for an informal job market
exist in residential locations, they can potentially be used for unemployment policies
and generate local spillovers.
If it is the case that people’s place of residence affects their labor market outcomes,
there is an incentive for political decision makers to alter the distribution of people.
One possibility to do so is via urban policies (urban renewal, investment in transporta-
tion infrastructure etc.), another way is to attempt to influence the relation of where
people work and live, namely commuting. The rationale to subsidize commuting in
most countries is to increase the efficiency and equity of the labor market. Subsidizing
commuting hence is a means to increase the search radius of workers and therefore to
enable matches in the labor market that might have failed otherwise.
In chapter 43 we analyze distributional effects of commuting subsidies, using a large scale
policy change in combination with geo-referenced employer-employee data. We employ
a difference-in-difference approach to analyze whether a partial withdrawl of commuting
subsidies is compensated by employers in the form of gross wage adjustments. We find
zero gross wage effects for all workers, and small but significant increases for specific
worker groups. Workers largely uncovered by collective wage agreements are compen-
sated by 8% of their net wage losses. Nevertheless, the large share of net wage losses
is carried by employees. We further look at how the policy reform’s tax burden was
distributed across worker groups and find that mostly high income workers suffer from
the governmental commuting subsidy’s withdrawal.
To motivate potential gross wage increases as a reaction to this policy change, consider
a simple model in which firms and workers are matched in the labor market. The qual-
ity of the match (i.e. the worker’s productivity) depends on the combination of the
worker’s skills and the specific tasks required for the job (see Brueckner et al. (2002)
and Helsley and Strange (1990)). Workers bear the costs of commuting to their employ-
ers. They choose the firm that offers the highest gross wage net of travel expenses. The
model makes interesting predictions about commuting reimbursement by firms. First,
it explains why firms have an incentive to compensate workers for traveling. If certain
workers match the firm’s skill requirements perfectly but are mislocated (i.e. commuting
3Chapter 4 consists of Assmann et al. (2016).
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distance to the firm is very large), the firm gains from compensating commuting as long
as the firm’s gains from the match with the mislocated worker exceed the expenses for
this compensation. Second, the model predicts how the firms’ commuting reimburse-
ments react to a rise in transport costs, e.g. because of a reduction of governmental
commuting subsidies. Again, if the firm’s gains from the match are sufficiently large,
the firm has an incentive to adjust gross wages in order to keep the productive but
mislocated employees.
In our setting, we use a German policy reform, which in 2007 substantially reduced
commuting subsidies for workers commuting more than 14 kilometers while leaving tax
breaks for workers with commuting distances smaller than 14km unchanged. We use
this variation in commuting costs to estimate whether and to what extent employers
compensate their workers for travel expenses. A large and novel data set allows to esti-
mate this effect precisely and consistently: We use a 25% sample of German record data
which provides geo-referenced information on workers’ exact place of work and place
of residence. From these data and using GIS-software we construct a precise measure
of road commuting distances, which has not been available so far. We find no wage
adjustment for our full sample of workers. When analyzing the effect for subgroups,
however, we find small but significant gross wage increases as a reaction to the policy
change, which are robust to several specifications. Employees working in industries with
a low coverage of collective wage agreements who are affected by the policy experience
an increase in wages of 0.08 percentage points as opposed to those unaffected. This
translates into a wage adjustment of 19 Euro after taxes, compared to an average net
wage loss of 241 Euro per year.
In Germany, the sum of foregone tax revenues from tax breaks on commuting amounts to
4.5 billion Euro annually (Bundesministerium der Finanzen (2010)), which corresponds
to 0.4% of overall public expenditures. These expenses are unlikely to be distributionally
neutral. The obvious question is, whether they are progressive or regressive in nature,
i.e., whether they benefit high or low-wage workers. We find that the regime prevailing
2007 is clearly regressive, while this effect is reduced substantially by introducing a lower
bound on commuting distances for tax breaks. We further analyze regional differences
and show that the reform has essentially equalized the distribution of tax savings across
regions measured by population density. Comparing East and West Germany, the re-
form has reduced inequality in tax savings by about 30% between regions. These results
are instructive beyond the German case, as we compare the two types of commuting
subsidies most frequently applied (see Potter et al. (2006) for an overview).
In summary, my thesis provides the following research contributions. First, it shows
that the correlation of migrants’ individual wages and their concentration in residential
neighborhoods is non-negative. Second, I provide credible evidence that there exist in-
formal networks based on residential locations in the German labor market, which are
5
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especially important for low qualified and minority workers. Third, I show that German
workers are only compensated to a small extent in the absence of commuting subsidies.
Additionally, designing commuting subsidies as a lump-sum deduction together with a
lower bound on per-kilometer deduction leads to a more equal distribution of tax savings
as opposed to without a lower bound.
6


Chapter 2
Residential Segregation of
Immigrants in Germany
2.1 Introduction
On average, Germans earn 2,400 Euro per month before taxes, whereas people of foreign
origin have a monthly income of only 1,800 Euro before taxes1: A substantial gap. Part
of this wage gap can be explained by the lack of transferability of human capital (see
e.g. Aldashev et al. (2008)) and on migrants’ lower human-capital endowments (Lang,
2005). Differences in the occupational choices made by foreigners (Constant and Massey,
2003) are also addressed in the literature. These reasons contribute to an inequality of
opportunity: As shown in a broad literature on neighborhood and peer effects (see e.g.
Case and Katz (1991), Glaeser et al. (2003), Marmaros and Sacerdote (2002) or Lud-
wig et al. (2008)), economic outcomes and opportunities depend not only on individual
achievements but are also highly dependent on the behavior of individuals interacting in
a non-work settting, e.g. the residential location and the mixture of groups residing in
one’s neighborhood. The central question in this paper is whether a degree of inequality
can be ascribed to locational patterns. It is generally assumed that poorer neighbor-
hoods mean worse “peer effects” and hence poorer economic opportunities. Potential
channels of such effects are the lack of positive role models, because of common insti-
tutions and resources (Jencks and Mayer, 1990), such as worse public goods in worse
neighborhoods, or because of a spatial mismatch (Kain, 1968). The latter means the
spatial separation of job access and residential location of minorities. All these channels
generate negative spillover effects for individuals living in worse city districts.
1Numbers are from data of the German Employment Panel (BAP), which is used for the empirical
analysis of this paper and presented in Section 2.3.
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The data set used consists of individual data for a random 2% sample of German em-
ployees subject to social security from 1998 until 2007 on a quarterly basis. It contains
labor market information, some socioeconomic information and residential information
in form of city districts. As residential segregation is an urban phenomenon, five big
German cities are selected into the sample: Berlin, Hamburg, Frankfurt/Main, Munich
and Stuttgart.
The empirical strategy is twofold: First I use a broad panel data set for the years of 1998
until 2007 and estimate a fixed effects model to determine the effect of high concentration
of foreigners on wages. There is a positive wage effect of the proportion of foreigners in
one’s neighborhood but a negative wage effect of being foreigner as opposed to German.
Second, I apply a city level cross sectional estimation including also measures for educa-
tional exposure and segregation by income. I test whether the latter two effects lead to
the main variation in wages as opposed to residential segregation. This can be rejected,
as educational exposure and income segregation do not influence foreigners’ earnings
significantly. In summary, the empirical results tend to a positive network effect for
foreigners, as they seem to profit from higher foreigner concentrations in their districts
or cities respectively. The paper draws attention to a topic fairly neglected in research:
How foreigner concentration and residential location affect individual earnings. Its em-
pirical approach and the extensive data set used shed light onto foreigners’ distribution
among and within German cities as well as their income development over time.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2.2, I summarize the
theoretical and empirical background for the empirical approach. Section 2.3 gives an
overview on the data and some descriptive statistics, Section 2.4 presents the empirical
strategy and its results. Section 2.5 evaluates the results critically and concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
2.2.1 Measuring Segregation
Segregation is defined as unequal spatial distribution and concentration of a distinct
group in a certain area. As Reardon and Sullivan (2004) emphasizes, segregation has
two main dimensions: Firstly, it is a question of the groups’ distribution inside a city.
Are group members evenly distributed or do they cluster in one district? Secondly,
what determines segregation is whether the group of interest is living side-by-side with
other groups: Does the group isolate or exposure itself to non-group members? Duncan
and Duncan (1955) establish measuring segregation with the Dissimilarity Index (DI).
The Dissimilarity Index is defined as DI = 12 ∑Ni=1( groupigrouptotal − nongroupinongrouptotal ), where group
represents a minority group and nongroup the reference group (here migrants will be
10
Chapter 2. Residential Segregation of Immigrants in Germany
group and nongroup Germans respectively). i indexes for the neighborhood and total
are all neighborhoods in a city. The DI ranges from 0 to 1 and focuses on the group’s
evenness of distribution throughout the smaller geographical areas which form a city. It
can be interpreted as the proportion of the minority group that would have to change
the residential area in order to generate an even distribution throughout the city.
The second established measure of segregation is the Isolation Index (II), which measures
the isolation of a group in the sense of living only with group members. The Isolation
Index is defined as II = ∑ni=1[ groupigrouptotal ∗ groupipopulationi ]− grouptotalpopulation total
min(1, grouptotal
populationtotal
)− grouptotal
populationtotal
. It describes the extent to
which the neighborhood-level group share experienced by the average group member
exceeds the level that would be expected under perfect integration. High values mean a
high level of isolation of the minority group, whereas a value near 0 implies a high degree
of mixing with other groups. These indices are used as measures of unequal distribution
in the empirical analysis in Section 2.4.
2.2.2 Consequences of Residential Segregation
Consequences of segregation can be positive as well as negative. Which effects dominate
for whom and how they can be separated is discussed in “Are ghettos good or bad?”
by Cutler and Glaeser (1997). The authors suggest that racial segregation can proxy
for segregation by skill which is what actually harms blacks, the assumed lower skilled
minority group. They show that increased racial discrimination can lead either to a
positive or negative utility effect for blacks: Either it means fewer black skilled will
live in black areas which leads to a decrease in utility2. If in contrast enhanced racial
segregation is not equivalent to segregation by skill, blacks will profit from an increase
in racial discrimination3. Consequently, a reduction in discrimination and segregation
does not necessarily lead to greater equality among groups. The authors also present
an empirical approach and discuss some difficulties: When public goods can be selected
by choosing residential location, more skilled and therefore wealthier blacks will move
to richer (white) areas. Consequently, in terms of intracity segregation the effect on
economic outcomes will be overstated. As a result of their theoretical model the authors
measure the impact of segregation on a city level and compare outcomes between more
and less segregated cities.
Cutler and Glaeser (1997) use the dissmilarity index to measure segregation on economic
and educational outcomes. The focus of interpretation in their work lies on the effect
2As the neighborhood’s average human capital influences individuals’ utility, skilled blacks moving out
of predominantly black neighborhoods leads to a reduction in utility for the remaining black inhabitants.
Especially skilled blacks will benefit from a higher share of skilled blacks in their own neighborhood.
3Skilled blacks are facing a market failure because they cannot internalize the positive externality of
skilled blacks moving into black neighborhoods. Hence, the discrimination costs serve as a tax helping
to internalize costs imposed on their own community by moving. (Cutler and Glaeser, 1997)
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of segregation on blacks when additionally controlling for an index for black income
segregation and educational exposure. The income segregation index4 is generated on a
city level. Its correlation with racial segregation is 0.7 which gives rise to the assumption
that the one might proxy for the other. Data from the Census Public Use Micro Sample
from 1990 is used and only young people are included in the sample to evade the problem
of endogenous residential location, in this case between cities. Only males between age
18 and 25 are included in the sample. The authors argue that young individuals do
not chose their residential location themselves but their locational choice is exogenously
given. This assumption is quite strong, especially regarding the decision makers in this
scenario: Individuals’ parents. The authors show that segregation significantly hurts
blacks comparatively more than whites.5
To test the interdependence of segregation by skill and by race, they first test whether
blacks are harmed more by racial segregation in cities with higher income segregation.
On that account a measure for income segregation is included in the regression. Second,
to test whether the worse performance of blacks is a result of low interaction with positive
role models - represented by the higher qualified white population - an exposure to high
education measure is included.6 The results show that segregation has a significantly
negative effect on blacks’ incomes. The authors do not find support for an influence
of income segregation in their data, as effects on the economic outcome variables are
not statistically significant. Educational spillover, however, influences blacks’ income
positively.
Cutler et al. (2008) investigate the effect of segregation on educational and economic
outcomes of particularly young immigrants to the United States. The sample used
consists of census data only for young male immigrants (age 20-30 years). The effect of
segregation here is given by the group share of the tract population, which is measured
via fixed effects estimations. For higher group shares, earnings are significantly smaller
than for lower ones, which reflects a negative impact of segregation on economic outcome.
As the coefficient for group share on MSA level has a positive sign, the authors conclude
that only an increase in tract level concentration not related to the overall MSA share
leads to negative economic outcomes. Apart from that, Cutler et al. (2008) find that
4The Black Income Segregation index is defined as IS = 1
2 ∑Ni=1 ∣ RichBlcak,iRichBlack,total − NonrichBlcak,iNonrichBlack,total ∣,
where rich blacks are those earning more than the 0.75 percentile of the black income distribution and
non-rich are all others.
5To bypass endogeneity, several instruments are included to substitute residential segregation. One
comprehends public finance, arguing in a Tiebout model environment: With a greater variety of local
governments and taxes within an area, individuals have a greater incentive to “vote with their feet” and
relocate given their preferences about public goods. Thus, sorting may be explicable in this way.
6The index for educational exposure is defined as EE = ∑Ni=1(BlackiBlack ) ∗ ( EduciPersonsi ) − ( EducPersons), which
represents the percentage of the average black’s census tract that is educated, where educated people
are defined as having attended college. The Educational Exposure index (EE) lies around zero and takes
on positive values when blacks are exposed to higher education in their residential area and is negative
if the education in their neighborhood is low.
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American cities’ segregation is mostly driven by segregation by income as opposed to
segregation by origin. In Section 2.4, I will build upon these two articles to test the
interplay of segregation and wages for German cities.
2.3 Data
In this paper, I use the slightly anonymized employment panel (BAP), which is provided
by the Institute of Employment Research (IAB). The BAP is a panel of micro data
from 1998 to 2007 on a quarterly basis. It is registry data from the German Federal
Employment Agency which collects labor market relevant data for all employees subject
to social security. This means self-employed and marginally employed individuals are
not part of the sample. A disadvantage of the data set is the reference only to individual
data, not to households7. As segregation is an urban phenomenon, five big German
cities are selected: Berlin, Hamburg, Frankfurt/Main, Stuttgart and Munich. The first
three are Germany’s biggest cities. Stuttgart is part of the sample because of its history
of “Gastarbeiter” and because it has the largest percentage of foreigners in the sample:
20.54% overall. To examine the impact of residential segregation on individual income,
it is important to consider smaller observation units in each city. Ideally neighborhoods
should be considered for the research’s purpose. In this case, the smallest units available
are offices of the employment agency, which correspond to districts within cities. The
sample consists of 44 geographical units of varying size8.
The remaining question is how to define “foreigners”. What determines a foreigner or
a German in this data set is one’s nationality; this of course ignores all foreign borns
with German nationality and “second generation” migrants, who are not identified in
the given data set. As Aldashev et al. (2008) point out, over 50% of all foreigners
living in Germany in 2005 also had German nationality9. Furthermore, distinguishing
between “foreign” and “German nationality” does not really fit the problem of earnings
inequality, as figure 2.1 shows. The two groups considered are called foreigner type 1 and
type 2 (F1 and F2)10. To differentiate between the two groups, per capita income of all
countries of origin available in the sample is compared (the definition follows the OECD
7Also information about children or an additional earner in the household is missing. This makes it
difficult to analyze households’ decision problems. I therefore approximate households with individual
data.
8An overview on all included residential districts is given in appendix A.
9Furthermore, the data set contains no information on duration of stay in Germany, which is why it
is not possible to account for assimilation and therefore equalization effects of longer stays in Germany,
as it is done in Lang (2005).
10It would be desirable to differentiate foreigner types further e.g. into older and newer migration
groups, as one could expect the former ones to have built networks within Germany. But as descriptives
show, the number of F2 foreigners is very small in some cities anyway such that finer classification would
probably lead to a loss of explanatory power.
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Figure 2.1: Mean Earnings for Germans and Types of Foreigners for 1998-2007 on
quarterly basis
data base from 2011). Foreigners whose home countries have a per capita income greater
than that of Germany will be assigned foreigner type 1, the rest type 2. The underlying
assumption is that individuals having a higher income in their home country are only
likely to move to another country if their income is even higher there to compensate
costs of migration. Type 1 foreigners mainly consist of western and northern European
countries plus USA, Canada and Australia. F2 foreigners embrace the home countries
of traditional German guest workers (southern Europe, Turkey and Tunisia) and “new”
immigrant countries like Eastern European and Asian countries.11 As figure 2.1 shows,
foreigners of type 1 seem even more aﬄuent than Germans. Moreover, their mean income
follows a slight upward trend over the time regarded in the sample. In contrast, F2 have
a constantly lower mean income. F1 probably does not generate negative spillovers
for Germans. Consequently, I use only F2 for the analysis of segregation and income
differentials.
2.3.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2.1 shows descriptive statistics12 of the selected cities. As described in Section 2.2,
the indices point to different aspects of segregation and its impacts on minority groups,
F2 in this case. Dissimilarity measures the evenness of a group’s distribution in a city.
In Germany, Berlin has the highest score: 30% of F2 would have to move to generate
an even distribution across districts. Glitz (2014) looks at workplace and residential
segregation of immigrants in Western Germany. He finds values of 0.14 in 2000 and 0.15
11Overall the cross sectional data consists of 3,935 F2 foreigners. 70.4% and hence the great majority
of these individuals come from the former guest worker countries. An overview on numbers of migrants
and origin is reported in appendix A.
12Note that the numbers presented in table 2.1 rely crucially on the definition of F2 foreigners: We
can account for a sample of employees subject to social security with the defined nationality. That is,
interpreting the percentages of F2 in the different cities ignores second generation migrants and refugees,
as all unemployed, all persons marginally employed and benefit recipients. This may lead to a different
picture than expected.
14
Chapter 2. Residential Segregation of Immigrants in Germany
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics on Migrant Segregation, 2007
City N Percentage F2 DI II Mean earnings*
Hamburg 8,326 6.34 0.2167 0.0768 2,580
Frankfurt/ M. 7,206 10.30 0.1704 0.1196 2,872
Stuttgart 5,862 12.85 0.1644 0.1468 2,744
Munich 13,065 10.41 0.1620 0.1193 2,859
Berlin 10,041 3.96 0.3019 0.0586 2,353
All numbers from BAP June 2007. Average wage is average monthly working income in the
sample. F2 denotes foreigners in whose country of origin per capita income is smaller than
that of Germany. * EUR per month (before taxes).
in 2005 for the whole of Germany, which is comparable in magnitude.
The Isolation Index describes the extent to which the minority group lives isolated and
only with group members. Berlin has the lowest level, whereas Stuttgart reaches the
highest although still quite moderate level.
Frankfurt is well known for problems with immigrant integration, which is not reflected
in the segregation indices. Munich exhibits low levels of segregation on both scales.
Although the overall share of F2 foreigners is comparatively high, mean income in Mu-
nich is high and the resident foreigners seem to be spread well over the city. Another
question that might arise from this descriptive analysis is, whether distinct dimensions
of segregation may influence the economic outcome in a different way.
Some caution should be applied when interpreting these indices. The classification of
residential areas varies widely across the selected sample: Berlin has the finest cate-
gorization and counts 12 administrative units within the municipality, Hamburg and
Stuttgart are divided in seven units and Munich and Frankfurt only in five. This is a
clear limitation of the data set which may affect the results of the study, however this
problem cannot be surmounted at this point.
A perhaps surprising feature is the relatively low proportion of F2 foreigners, especially
in Berlin. The given sample consists only workers in jobs subject to social security.
Furthermore, the restrictive definition of foreigners as individuals of foreign nationality
and the selection of F2 countries should be kept in mind. Although the percentage of
foreigners varies across cities, the mean earnings are quite similar. In view of this, the
hypothesis that pure numbers of foreigners (absolute or relative) affect mean incomes
negatively can not be supported. It is therefore useful to consider levels of segregation
in the cities.
It is evident that the phenomenon of segregation is less severe than it is for the United
States. In American cities, the DI ranges from 0.35 to a maximum of 0.62 (Cutler et al.,
2008). This means even the least segregated American city exhibits a higher level of
segregation than Berlin, the city with the highest level in my sample. This first result
should be kept in mind for all subsequent interpretations.
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics Germans vs. Immigrants, June 2007
Variable Germans F2 Migrant
Mean monthly wage 2,702 2,094
(1533) (1329)
Mean education 13.18 11.5
(2.83) (2.77)
Share F2 in district 0.09 0.13
Proportion working part time 0.22 0.25
Proportion female 0.50 0.46
Standard deviations are listed in parentheses. F2 denotes for-
eigners in whose country of origin per capita income is smaller
than that of Germany.
Apart from the differences across cities, I am interested in differences between the mi-
nority and majority group of my analysis. Table 2.2 summarizes some variables of main
interest for Germans and F2 from 2007. F2 earn on average less per month and are on
average also less educated. Their average years of education are only 11.5 compared to
13.2 for Germans. Not surprisingly, the proportion of foreigners living in individuals’
residential area is about one third higher for F2 than for Germans.
Overall, the descriptive statistics suggest variation first in geographical entities and sec-
ond between Germans and non-Germans. Whether these differences can be attributed
to income differences is discussed in the next section.
2.4 Empirical Analysis
2.4.1 Fixed Effects Estimation
The first empirical strategy is the approach suggested by Cutler et al. (2008) using the
panel data set described in Section 2.3. The general fixed effects panel estimation is
described in equation (2.4.1).
yi,t = αi + x′i,tβ + εi,t (2.1)
with i indexing individuals, t being the time period, ε being an i.i.d. disturbance. αi is
a vector of unobserved, individual but time invariant effects which captures unobserved
heterogeneity. The dependent variable in the Fixed Effects model is the logarithm of
monthly earnings. I use a fixed effects model to eliminate unobserved time invariant
effects on individual wage. The variation to identify differences in earnings as a result
of residential location will thereby only be a result of changes in foreigner shares or
concentration within a district. The variables of main interest are a dummy for being a
foreigner of type 2 (F2), the proportion of F2 living together in one residential district
(F2district) as well as an interaction term (F2×F2district), which measures the impact
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Table 2.3: Fixed Effects Panel Estimation
Variable Ind. FE
F2district .0885∗∗
(.0441)
F2×F2district .0021
(.1132)
F2 × agecity .0530
(.0519)
F2 × educcity .1973
(.1318)
DI -.5671∗
(.3350)
II .0713
(.6439)
Adj. R2 .3142
N 1.48 Mio
Cluster and heteroskedasticity robust standard errors listed
in parentheses. ∗/∗∗/∗∗∗mark significance at the 10%/5%/1%
significance level. F2 denotes migrants whose country of origin
has a smaller per capita income than Germany (see Section
2.2). agecity denotes the mean age of migrants in a city and
proxies for assimilation effects. educcity is F2’s mean educa-
tion in a city.
of district concentration for F2. Additionally, a set of control variables is included to
account for differences in education and occupation, which are also main drivers for
immigrant wage gaps (see e.g. Lang (2005), Constant and Massey (2003) and Aldashev
et al. (2008))13.
The estimation addresses the question of central interest: Does living in neighborhoods
with a high proportion of migrants have an impact on monthly income? And does this
impact differ for Germans living in such districts as opposed to foreigners themselves?
The impact of proportion of foreigners in the neighborhood on income is positive and
significant. As in Cutler et al. (2008), variables indicating city wide information on
foreigners are also included in the estimation. F2agecity is a city specific variable which
determines the mean age of F2 individuals in a city. It is used as a proxy for duration
of the immigrants’ stay, since they are assumed to be more assimilated the longer they
stay in a country. This duration of stay has no significant impact on earnings, as well
as F2educcity (a city wide group mean, which states the mean level of immigrants’ edu-
cation). The effect of uneven distribution of foreigners (DI) in a city stays negative but
only significant at a 10% level. The Isolation Index’s effect is not significantly different
from 0, which is in line with Cutler et al. (2008). This suggests that isolation has no
impact on individual earnings. Regarding the goodness-of-fit, the model seems to be
13Control variables and definitions are listed in appendix A.
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quite good specified as they explain 31% of the sample variation.
All in all, the picture drawn by the panel regression is diverse: On the one hand, concen-
tration in a neighborhood seems to have a positive effect on wages, as reflected by the
positive sign of F2district. A possible explanation is a network effect where potentially
“more similar” individuals help each other to find a job. On the other hand concentra-
tion within a city negatively affects income of both foreigners and Germans. One driver
of the effect could be that, overall, a higher concentration of a group with lower socioe-
conomic background characteristics (see table A.1) diminishes overall earnings, because
of negative role models or worsening public goods14.
Apart from those effects, all other variables of interest are not statistically different
from zero. A major problem in this fixed effects specification is the small variation in
the variables of interest over time.
I conduct several robustness checks, including different specifications15. I test for ran-
dom effects (which could solve the problem of low time variation) and the possibility
of pooled OLS using a Hausman test, which both have to be rejected. To control for
sample selection, I restrict the sample to males only, as they have a higher workforce
participation. The results again stay qualitatively the same. I conclude that insufficient
time variation is the main problem in this specification, which is why I exploit another
type of variation in the next section.
2.4.2 Intercity Approach
Following Cutler and Glaeser (1997), mobility is assumed to occur only on a city level16.
As opposed to the last section I use cross sectional data from June 2007, containing
48,476 observations. Additional to the controls used in 2.4.1, the measures for income
segregation and educational exposure are included in the regression. I do so to test
whether these proxy for residential segregation’s effect on earnings17. To get a first
impression, their city wide levels are listed in table 2.4. As table 2.4 shows, there is only
little segregation by income in most of the cities, only Berlin constitutes an exception.
Munich has the lowest level, where only 2.87% of the rich foreigners would have to move
14E.g. children with worse socioeconomic background can affect children in their classes negatively.
Carrell and Hoekstra (2010) show how children subject to domestic violance have a negative causal effect
on their classmates’ performance and behavior.
15Instead of individual FE I also estimate the model using country of origin and city FE. None of these
specifications change the results qualitatively, and the impact of the variables of main interest again is
mostly insignificant.
16Considering the cities in the sample, which are geographically far spread in Germany, the assumption
seems reasonable.
17To compute the income segregation index, foreigners are divided into rich and non-rich. The income
segregation index (IS) depicts how many rich foreigners would have to move to generate an even income
distribution across the city. As in Cutler and Glaeser (1997), foreigners are defined to be rich if their
monthly income lies above the 0.75 percentile of foreigner F2’s income distribution (the 0.75 percentile
is 2,958 Euro per month). Non-rich are all individuals earning less or equal.
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Table 2.4: Income Segregation and Educational Exposure
City Income Segregation Educational Exposure
Hamburg 0.1078 0.7469
Frankfurt/ M. 0.0370 0.7323
Stuttgart 0.0595 0.6393
Munich 0.0287 0.7346
Berlin 0.2554 0.8383
Note: The data is based on cross sectional data from June 2007 and contains
48,476 observations.
to generate an even income distribution within the city. A reason for that might be
the overall high income level in Munich and the small number of geographical units
there. For the educational exposure index (EE)18 high levels implicate a high degree
of integration. Here Berlin is most integrated whereas Stuttgart has the lowest level
of educational exposure. Here the problem of sorting by education seems most severe,
although again values for German cities are comparably low.
I include no residential area variables, but only city wide segregation measures plus
city control variables, to ensure that the estimates of main interest are not driven by
differences between cities19. To estimate segregation on the city level, I follow the
specification proposed by Cutler and Glaeser (1997):
ln(wage)i = α + β1ln(population)c + β2ln(income)c + β3DIc + β4DIc × F2i + β5IIc+
β6IIc × F2i + β7ISc + β8ISc × F2i + β9ESc + β10ESc × F2i +X ′iγ + i
(2.2)
According to the interpretation of Cutler and Glaeser (1997), the focus in the following
lies on the interaction term of the segregation indices and a dummy for being F2 for-
eigner. Consider the first column: The city controls are significant as is the measure for
segregation. Hence, the before measured effects are not purely city wide effects account-
ing for wage levels, but do reflect the actual effect of residential segregation. Uneven
distribution within a city has a significant negative effect on foreigners’ own earnings
(DI × F2). The effect for Germans (DI) in contrast is positive and insignificant. Isola-
tion, however, is positive and statistically significant both for Germans and foreigners.
Again, this suggests the interpretation of beneficial social group networks. The effect for
Germans is greater in magnitude than that for foreigners, which may reflect a majority
effect.
Column (2) includes tests for two further hypotheses: First, I test whether residential
18For computing educational segregation index all individuals are taken into account to measure
foreigners’ exposure to highly educated individuals. Everyone having at least “German Abitur” is
considered as highly educated.
19Such differences could consist of general differences in the local labor markets as job opportunities,
general wage levels or other differences in structures or institutions.
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Table 2.5: Intercity Cross Sectional Estimation
W/o additional indices Incl. IS and EE
(1) (2)
ln(population)c .0317∗∗ .0394∗∗
(.0113) (.0135)
ln(income)c .2481∗∗ .5419∗∗∗
(.0990) (.1207)
DI .3285
(.3690)
DI ×F2 -.02177∗∗ -2.6751
(.1017) (2.7342)
II .9697∗∗∗
(.2998)
II×F2 .3566∗∗ .7607∗
(.1671) (.3905)
IS .4445∗
(.2375)
IS ×F2 1.5017
(1.4867)
EE -.3499∗∗∗
(.1113)
EE×F2 .4182
(.5405)
Adj. R2 .6091 .6091
N 48,476 48,476
Cluster and heteroskedasticity robust standard errors listed in parentheses. ∗/∗∗/∗∗∗mark significance at the 10%/5%/1% significance level. F2 denotes foreigners, whose
country of origin has a smaller per capita income than Germany, see Section 2.3. DI
and II are segregation indices, IS is an index for integration by skill. EE denotes
educational exposure.
segregation by origin is just a proxy for segregation by income, which is done by in-
cluding the IS. Second, I test whether foreigners earn less because they live away from
positive role models by including the educational exposure index, measuring the degree
to which foreigners are in contact with highly educated individuals, based on their resi-
dential location.
DI × F220 stays negative but is insignificant. This means with income and educational
segregation measures as a control, uneven distribution by origin has no effect signifi-
cantly different from zero on foreigners’ wages. Again the coefficient on II has a positive
sign and is slightly significant. Isolation hence is still beneficial for migrants but the
reliability of its effect is dubious. Income segregation (IS) has a positive sign with sig-
nificance at 10% level: This would mean income segregation is beneficial for Germans.
When Germans benefit from income segregation, for their group spillover effects are
more important. This result is consistent with Cutler and Glaeser (1997), where skilled
20The effects of housing segregation on Germans are omitted because of perfect collinearity in this
specification.
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groups always profit more from spillovers. The interaction with F2 is also positive, but
insignificant.
The educational exposure index (EE) is highly significant for Germans and has a negative
sign. Educational integration of foreigners hence influences German wages negatively.
This result is surprising at first glance. A possible interpretation might be that Germans
profit from having exclusive access to education and thus better job access than foreign
workers. But there may also be other forces driving the variation, and the result by
itself does not seem convincing.
In column (2) neither residential segregation nor segregation by income provide reliable
results. The hypothesis of income segregation proxying for a sorting by origin hence
cannot be supported by the data: Income segregation is significant only for Germans.
The second hypothesis can be rejected: For migrants there is no significant effect on
earnings when being exposed to highly educated individuals. A reason for that result
may be the little variation in the indices as presented in table 4 as well as the too broad
classification of “neighborhoods” which again determines the potential interaction.
Regarding the goodness of fit measures, both specifications have the same adjusted R2.
The levels are quiet high, but as the magnitude does not change when adding the IS and
EE, these measures do not seem to have any additional explanatory power. It appears
their inclusion is not an appropriate explanation to the German-foreigner wage gap.
Comparing these results to those presented by Cutler and Glaeser (1997), who inves-
tigate effects on economic outcomes for immigrants to the US, some differences are
apparent. First, the authors’ hypotheses cannot be confirmed for German cities. Sec-
ond, segregation seems to have an arbitrary effect in the German case. The authors of
the role paper include only a dissimilarity index whereas I include an isolation index as
well.21 As well as in Cutler and Glaeser (1997), in the German case uneven distribution
(DI) seems to have a negative effect on foreigners’ earnings.
2.5 Conclusion
Some caution about causal interpretation is appropriate in this setting: First of all,
there is an endogeneity problem with respect to self sorting into districts within a city.
One way Cutler et al. (2008) and Cutler and Glaeser (1997) try to handle this issue is
to only include men younger than 25 in the sample, because they are assumed not to
decide where they live on their own. They do not only investigate segregation’s impact
on earnings, but also on other economic outcomes. In this paper, using only young indi-
viduals is a too strong restriction. First the data set only contains working population
21This is done mainly because of consistency in procedure but also to emphasize the different aspects
of segregation’s appearance.
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and does not include information on youths in their education. Better qualified indi-
viduals may be excluded from the outset. Especially better qualified foreigners might
hence be excluded from the sample. Individuals achieving a university degree are part
of the workforce only from an age of 25 years onwards, for foreigners probably even
later, if they e.g. lose a year in school because they have to learn the German language
first. This procedure would lead to selection bias, and thus this approach seems not to
be suitable for the purpose of this work. This may lead to a bias on the estimates and
the standard errors. For this reason, I only interpret the direction of the effect as well
as the relative magnitude as compared to the other estimates. However, if we suppose
that especially unskilled immigrants move to district with a community of their own
nationality to overcome linguistic and cultural barriers (negative self selection), then
this would be associated with a negative income effect. If I still find a positive effect for
foreigners in Germany, this might point to an even higher value of networks.
Apart from that, there is another severe problem considering the data: To observe ef-
fects from living in a specific area, the definition of this district is crucial. As a result of
data restrictions and privacy regulations, the “neighborhood” definition applied in this
paper is quite broad (as districts encompass very different areas like “Berlin Mitte” and
“Munich City”) and can give only a hint on the importance of inner city inequalities.
Another severe problem with the data set used is the definition of migrants by their na-
tionality, which leaves out a great proportion of migrants with German nationality and
can thereby bias estimates on wage differences (see Aldashev et al. (2008)). However,
these drawbacks make it even more important to continue research in this important
field especially for a country like Germany, where the debate on immigrant integration
has become a constant part of political debate. This quantitatively based research could
also be augmented by a qualitative analysis which could improve the understanding of
the complicated issues of segregation and inequality. The first important result of this
work is that the magnitude of segregation in German cities is much less severe than
residential segregation is e.g. in the US. Second, uneven distribution of foreigners has a
negative effect on earnings in both estimated models. Living isolated from other groups,
foreigners living in German cities tend to profit from an enhanced contact to their own
kind. Networks to find a job and overcome cultural and linguistic barriers may play
a role in this finding. Although integration is politically aimed, it might not always
be a beneficial concept for all groups. Immigrants are on average a group with lower
socioeconomic background characteristics. A high concentration of lower socioeconomic
characteristics might affect public goods. Another important issue in this context is how
these effects might affect housing values and real estate prices in such neighborhoods
and cities overall. Future research should test whether effects on public goods translate
negatively into house price changes in those areas. For example, Kane et al. (2005) find
that house prices react to a change of sociodemographic compositions of schools, the
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public goods influencing locational choice and therefore neighborhood housing prices
the most. Both income effect and the indirect effect on public goods can affect housing
prices negatively.
Combining with the positive network effect discerned in this paper, integration policy
needs to be carefully considered: Desegregation policies might help to diminish the nega-
tive effect on public goods on housing prices and overall welfare. But these policies stand
in contrast with positive network effect for immigrants. More careful research should
be done to identify the causality of effects. However, policies affecting public goods in
districts highly populated by immigrants appear to be a more appropriate instrument
than general residential policies.
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Chapter 3
Job referrals based on residential
location networks
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I want to overcome the main problems of chapter 2, namely the in-
accuracy of the neighborhood definition and the improper control for self-selection. I
therefore supply more precise and valid evidence for the interplay of space and labor
markets. I analyze the existence of informal networks based on residential locations.
These networks can be used to find a job and therefore link the labor market directly
to peoples’ location in space.
This chapter is based on joint work with Norbert Schanne (IAB Nuremberg) and consists
of a subsequent version of Hawranek and Schanne (2014) and Hawranek and Schanne
(2015).
We examine how residential neighborhoods can serve as a pool of information for an
informal labor market and investigate the effect of job referrals through one’s residential
location. In particular, we analyze the relationship between living and working together
in the context of job referrals in the Rhine-Ruhr metropolitan area. The Rhine-Ruhr is
Germany’s largest and the EU’s second largest agglomeration, located in North Rhine-
Westphalia. It is spread across 7,110 km2 including big cities like Cologne, Du¨sseldorf
and Dortmund. The metropolitan area is home to over 11 million inhabitants and is
especially interesting for urban analysis due to its densely populated nature and the
economic diversity.1
1Traditionally, the Rhine-Ruhr was specialized in heavy industry and mining. The structural change
in the 1960s lead to a specialization in the service sector. Until today, the area is economically contrasting
with high unemployment rates in Dortmund and Gelsenkirchen on the one hand and the prospering Rhine
area on the other hand. See figure B.1 in Appendix B.
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We use a novel data set covering geo-coded record data for the entire working population
(liable to social security) and all corresponding establishments. As social interaction is
not measurable directly with any kind of administrative data, we use a well-established
approach to approximate local network effects following Bayer et al. (2008): We esti-
mate the propensity of two individuals to work at the same place when residing in the
same neighborhood (reported with an accuracy of 500m×500m grid cells) with a linear
probability model (LPM). We compare this effect to the propensity of two individuals
residing in adjacent neighborhoods, conditional on a super-neighborhood fixed effect
(where super-neighborhoods are all adjacent neighborhood grid cells).
We rule out several alternative explanations for this propensity effect, in particular a
reverse direction of housing referrals amongst colleagues and the spurious correlation
due to the geography of workplaces and transportation infrastructure, by conducting a
number of robustness checks. This makes us confident that we interpret the measured
effect as an indication for job referrals where information on an informal job market
circulating in one’s residential neighborhood.
Our approximation of the referral effect does not allow us to differentiate who (within
a pair) benefits from this local network effect. In this chapter we focus on identifying
the existence and credibility of a residential referral effect. Our network effect clearly
is an approximation for network activity. Our estimates can only be a lower bound as
presumably other forms of networks exist in an informal job market. The literature dis-
tinguishes three types of informal job market networks: Networks of former coworkers
or classmates (see e.g. Glitz (2015), Dustmann et al. (2014), Kramarz and Thesmar
(2013), Marmaros and Sacerdote (2002), Hensvik and Nordstro¨m Skans (forthcoming)
and Saygin et al. (2014)), family networks (see e.g. Kramarz and Thesmar (2013)), and
residence based networks (see e.g. Bayer et al. (2008), Schmutte (2015), Hellerstein et al.
(2011)). We show that residence based networks play an important role, especially for
low skilled workers and ethnic minorities.
In this chapter, we look at how referral effects based on residential location may dif-
fer for a European country as opposed to US American data, given that institutional
backgrounds and cultural conventions are quite different with respect to the labor mar-
ket and job search. In addition, we are able to investigate a number of issues in order
to shed further light on actual job referral effects: First, our data allows us to dis-
tinguish between the effects on working in the same neighborhood and working in the
same establishment - probably the more accurate measure for job referrals. Second, an
advantage of the data set we use is the overlapping structure of our reference groups,
the so-called super-neighborhoods. A crucial assumption for the identification of social
interaction is that there is no sorting by unobservables within these reference groups.
When conditioning on a fixed reference group as in Bayer et al. (2008) or Schmutte
(2015), this assumption is less likely to hold as when using a rolling window design.
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Third, we analyze to what extent the findings are due to highly concentrated clusters
of employment opportunities in central business districts, and find small positive bias
in the referral to a neighborhood. Finally, we address to what extent people tend to
work in their residential neighborhood, and whether the evidence in the literature is
affected by inadequately accounting for short-distance commuting behavior. In contrast
to previous work, we also incorporate data on commuting networks and find them not
to be the driver of our measured interaction effect.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 gives an overview on
the related literature. Section 3.3 describes the data set we use for the German Rhine-
Ruhr area. Section 3.4 presents the research design and the baseline model. In Section
3.5 we discuss our results and robustness checks and further specifications in Section
3.6. Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Literature Review on Neighborhood and Network Ef-
fects
The connection between labor market outcomes and residential neighborhoods is twofold:
First, there is a strand of literature regarding the direct effect of neighborhoods on in-
dividual behavior which is then translated into economic outcomes. Second, residential
locations can serve as a meeting point and hence be interpreted to create social net-
works2.
If residential location plays the role of a social peer group, which influences individual
behavior via peer pressure (for unemployed to find a job) or through the need to re-
semble your peers (neighbors), then one can expect that people in a neighborhood with
a high share of employed neighbors will be likely to find a new job when unemployed
more quickly. This is also the case, when neighborhoods serve as a pool of information
to build networks where information on new job opportunities flows. In this latter case,
one can expect individuals to find a job at their neighbors’ firms more quickly, if the
share of employed neighbors is higher.
In this second chapter, I focus on social interactions in the form of network effects
on an informal job market. As Montgomery (1991) points out, the labor market is
characterized by asymmetric information. Employers cannot observe applicants’ true
productivity, such that they have an incentive to rely on referrals from their own em-
ployees to reduce search costs and avoid adverse selection. 3 Additionally, Topa (2001)
2An overview on neighborhood and network effects in a very general setting can be found in Topa
and Zenou (2014).
3Hensvik and Nordstro¨m Skans (forthcoming) test the model empirically and show that Swedish
employers use employees’ networks as a signal for their productivity.
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shows that workers have an incentive to share information on available jobs with their
network while being employed, as this information sharing serves as an insurance in the
event of unemployment. Hence, in equilibrium one should observe assortative matching
of employees with their social networks. Conley and Topa (1999) suggest, residential
neighborhoods are a natural form of networks for information exchange. Neighborhoods
qualify as information transmission environments, because of the low transportation
costs within neighborhoods (both monetary and time) and because of local institutions,
such as schools, churches or clubs, where people can meet and interact.
The work most related to ours is Bayer et al. (2008), who also estimate the propensity of
working together, when living in the same as opposed to a nearby neighborhood. They
use the 1990 U.S. Census of Population for the Boston metropolitan area and define
census blocks as neighborhoods and census block groups as super-neighborhoods. We
choose this paper as a point of departure, as the authors make a strong case for identi-
fying social interaction in a very specific way, given the assumption of no correlation in
unobservables within super-neighborhoods. In contrast to Bayer et al. (2008), our data
provides information on the exact establishments of workers. This specification reflects
a referral effect much more realistically. First, because theory (e.g. Montgomery (1991))
suggests that employers have an incentive to hire workers’ social contacts. Therefore we
expect to observe workers from the same network at a firm level. Second, it is more likely
that workers gather information on job openings in their own establishment rather than
its neighborhood.
Numerous other papers emphasize the importance of informal job markets like Ioannides
and Loury (2004) and Corcoran et al. (1980) using US data. Brenzel et al. (2016) show
that about every third position is filled with a friend or acquaintance of the staff in
Germany. Glitz (2014) and Dustmann et al. (2014) investigate the effects of coworker
networks on labor market outcomes using German and Saygin et al. (2014) using Aus-
trian record data. Glitz (2014) finds strong positive effects on own probability of working
and wages, which indicates significant effects of social networks in the German labor force
on labor market outcomes.
Ioannides and Loury (2004) summarize stylized facts on the usage of informal job search
channels. About 15% of unemployed Americans use friends and acquaintances for job
search.4 They report variation in the usage of such information channels among age and
socioeconomic groups: E.g. women and higher educated people use friends and family
less often whereas the findings for older people are opposing.5 Kramarz and Thesmar
4Using the PSID 1993, Ioannides and Loury (2004) find that 15.5% of unemployed and 8.5% of
employed ask friends and relatives about potential job openings.
5Ports (1993) find increased usage of informal channels for 45-55 year-olds and 55-65 year-olds in
1992 respectively analyzing CPS data. On the contrary, e.g. Corcoran et al. (1980) report that usage
of informal job market declines with age and/or work experience. Holzer (1987) finds that especially
young people aged 16 to 23 rely on friends and relatives in 60-70% of all jobs they actually attain (using
data on search methods from the 1981 NLSY).
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(2013) analyze how networks of families affect labor market outcomes. Following Gra-
novetter (1973), they distinguish between how strong ties (namely family) and weak ties
(like classmates and neighbors) affect the decisions of Swedish youths entering the labor
market. They use a population wide data set linking graduation records and family ties
to longitudinal matched employer-employee data and find that the effect of strong ties
is important, but only significant if one parent is currently employed at the same plant.
The effect is stronger for low educated youths and for immigrants.
Pellizzari (2010) shows6 that about 30% of Germans use personal contacts for finding a
job whereas only about 15% of US Americans use such search channels. These numbers
suggests that job referrals play an even more important role in European countries as
compared to the US7.
Hellerstein et al. (2011) test for the presence and importance of residential networks (de-
fined by census tracts) to determine the assignment of workers to establishments. They
use a measure of workplace segregation by residential origin and compare it to the share
of coworkers that would come from the same neighborhood if workplaces were randomly
assigned. They find a significant role of residence based networks using US 2000 De-
cennial Employer-Employee Database (DEED), which is especially strong for unskilled
workers, minorities and workers in small establishments. Using a similar method and
the same data, Hellerstein et al. (2014) investigate the outcome of residence-based labor
market networks. They find a positive earnings effects and a lower turnover for work-
ers more connected to their neighbors, especially if neighbors have the same race and
hence interpret their results as evidence for productivity enhancing spillovers. Schmutte
(2015) also studies the effects of residence based networks on earnings. Identifying local
interaction with the design of Bayer et al. (2008) as a first stage, he uses LEHD US
employer-employee data to estimate an employer-specific wage premium. He finds that
workers living in a neighborhood with high-quality networks are more likely to move to
a better paying job. In particular, a one standard deviation increase in network quality
is associated with a 25% increase in firm-specific wage premium on job change.
Overall, the literature is unambiguous on the existence and importance of informal job
markets. The evidence suggests that referral effects differ between socioeconomic char-
acteristics, which is why we differentiate between industries, age groups, nationality and
education categories to quantify the extent.
6The author uses the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) from 1994-2001 and the NLSY
from 1979-2000.
7The difference in data sources limits the exact comparability of these numbers.
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3.3 Data
We employ registry data which are collected in the administrative processes of the Ger-
man Federal Employment Agency (FEA, Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit) and maintained in
the Integrated Employment Biographies (IEB) of the Institute of Employment Research
(Institut fu¨r Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, IAB). The IEB cover all employed
persons who pay statutory social security contributions, all recipients of benefits from
unemployment security (according to Social Code III) or from basic life support (accord-
ing to Social Code II), all participants in active labor market policy, as well as all persons
who approach FEA for job-search support. As our analysis focuses on estimating the
probability of working together, we only use people in employment.
To ease computation we use data only for the Rhine-Ruhr region, Germany’s largest
metropolitan area. It is a very densely populated area reflecting several aspects that
also represent the whole of Germany. The area is diverse in its wealth and socioeconomic
structure. It includes on the one hand prospering university cities like Bonn and on the
other hand former heavy industry and mining centers, which have a high population of
immigrants and a high proportion of unemployment like Gelsenkirchen.
The IAB Research Data Centre geo-coded both the work-place and the residential ad-
dress of the IEB at June 30th 2008 (see Scholz et al. (2012)). Each person is assigned to
a quadratic grid cell of 500m length to warrant anonymity compulsory in social security
data provision. We use these grid cells as our basic definition of a neighborhood.
u
C
u
D
u
A
uB
Figure 3.1: Defining Neighborhood by a regular Grid
Figure 3.1 illustrates the structure of the neighborhood definition: According to the
exact address, every individual is assigned to a grid cell (the small squares in figure 3.1).
Individuals A and B are immediate neighbors, whereas C shares what we will further on
call a “super-neighborhood” with A and B. D lives within a super-neighborhood of C
but not with A and B. In contrast to Bayer et al. (2008) and Schmutte (2015) who use
predefined census blocks (neighborhoods) which belong to a fixed census block group
(super-neighborhood). In our design, every grid cell (neighborhood) is the centroid of
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a super-neighborhood and thus every grid cell belongs to several super-neighborhoods.
Although the classification of neighborhoods and super-neighborhoods does not depend
on geographic factors such as big roads or rivers, the flexible design guarantees an as-
signment for each grid cell to be the centroid of a super-neighborhood as well as part
of the surrounding for all neighboring grid cells. We believe that this overlapping sam-
pling scheme is an advantage as measured interaction is still very local but the condi-
tioning surrounding is flexible.8 It may frequently happen that a person resides close
to the outside border of the super-neighborhood when using a fixed definition as in
Bayer et al. (2008). This causes scenarios, in which the adjacent reference group or
super-neighborhood is closer to a person than the actual reference group the estima-
tion strategy is conditioning on9. We use super-neighborhood fixed effects to deal with
sorting on the basis of unobservables. As every grid cell belongs to 9 different super-
neighborhoods, the influence of the remaining sorting within super-neighborhoods should
be reduced substantially. Besides, using a neighborhood definition that is based on real
distances rather than the number of people sharing a neighborhood (as it is the case for
census blocks and census block groups) makes accounting for distances to workplaces
and reflecting commuting behavior more realistic.
We observe roughly 4 million persons in our data, dispersed across 21,509 grid cells, who
are aged 15-65 and participate in the labor force (without self-employed, civil servants
and members of the armed forces). Of these persons, roughly 3.5 million are employees.
To make computation feasible, we draw a 2% random sample from all employed per-
sons and further denote these individuals as i. For all of these i, we match all possible
neighbors j who either reside in the same neighborhood or super-neighborhood. In our
analysis, a pair ij, who reside in the same super-neighborhood, refers to one observation.
Our sample thus consists of 68,947 individuals i, 3.2 million of potential neighbors j and
a sample of 179.7 million pairs ij.
Compared to working with (possibly larger) samples for both individuals and neigh-
bors, the one-sided sampling has the advantage to enable conclusions on job referrals
in the population more easily (with one-dimensional sampling probabilities, respec-
tively univariate rather than bivariate cumulated densities). Figure B.2 in appendix
B shows the distribution of neighborhood and super-neighborhood sizes. The mass of
the neighborhood-size distribution lies in the range between 150 and 700 persons per grid
cell; the average neighborhood size is around 320. However, the average pair is observed
in a neighborhood with more than 900 inhabitants because larger neighborhoods have a
higher probability to be represented in the sample, and a person in a large neighborhood
8This kind of mutually non-exclusive rolling-window delineation of super-neighborhoods is also a
method of identifying neighborhood effects (Bramoulle´ et al., 2009).
9If we would consider only the lower block of grid cells in figure 3.1 as a fixed reference group, e.g.
individual B would have D in its reference group, but none in the adjacent grid cells on its right or
above.
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has more neighbors.
The geographic scale in the IEB data set differs from that in the role model paper.
While Bayer et al. (2008) use census blocks (which on average measure 160m of length)
as a definition for neighborhoods, our neighborhoods are considerably larger measuring
500m×500m. Nevertheless, we believe that this extent is small enough to guarantee
the possibility of people interacting with each other. For example the edge length of a
grid cell corresponds to the standard distance between bus stops for medium and highly
populated urban areas (see Ko¨hler and Bertocchi, 2010). It approximates a walking dis-
tance of five minutes. Social interaction in a residential neighborhood can occur through
meeting at points such as sport clubs, churches or elementary schools10.
Legend
Municipalities
Employment per grid cell
20 - 118
119 - 245
246 - 387
388 - 552
553 - 794
795 - 1235
1236 - 22560 10 20 305 Kilometers
Figure 3.2: Employees in 500×500m grid cells in the Rhine-Ruhr metropolitan area
To illustrate neighborhood sizes and the geographic extent of the data set, figure 3.2
shows the dispersion of individuals in our sample across the Rhein-Ruhr area. Each
dot represents a 500×500m grid cell and corresponds to our definition of a residential
10The Rhine-Ruhr area has 1,774 elementary schools, which differ in their dispersion: There is one
elementary school per 2,522 inhabitants and a maximum 7,840 inhabitants per elementary school (data
from the ministry of education in North Rhine-Westphalia at www.schulministerium.nrw.de). If e.g.
parents meet when picking up their children and possibly form social contacts there, the extent of
the draw area is larger than that of a residential neighborhood in our definition but smaller than a
super-neighborhood.
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neighborhood. The most densely populated grid cells (red areas) coincide with the area
around Cologne in the South, Du¨sseldorf in the West and Dortmund in the East.
Table 3.1: Group Sizes in Population and Sample
Group Population Sample Neighbors Super-neighbors
i j w/ Rij = 1 j w/ Rij = 0
Male 0.5181 .5168 .5182 .5180
Age 15-24 0.0985 .0991 .0993 .0993
Age 25-34 0.2000 .2001 .2053 .2023
Age 35-54 0.5392 .5405 .5417 .5439
Age 55-65 0.1531 .1515 .1536 .1545
Unskilled 0.1485 .1477 .1509 .1493
Med. skilled 0.4750 .4780 .4722 .4752
Highskilled 0.0963 .0932 .0960 .0967
German 0.9032 .9018 .8992 .9023
Greek 0.0051 .0052 .0053 .0051
Italian 0.0086 .0083 .0089 .0086
Spanish 0.0019 .0021 .0020 .0020
Turkish 0.0352 .0355 .0372 .0357
Yugoslaviana 0.0104 .0105 .0108 .0104
From new EUa 0.0068 .0070 .0067 .0068
Other nationality 0.0288 .0296 .0298 .0290
Primary sector 0.0395 .0405 .0388 .0394
Manufacturing 0.1763 .1779 .1754 .1764
Construction 0.0458 .0455 .0455 .0457
TTCb 0.2622 .2643 .2630 .2620
Business Services 0.1757 .1746 .1765 .1758
Other Services 0.3005 .2972 .3007 .3008
# employees 3,459,941 68,947 3,169,180 3,397,929
Yugoslavian covers immigrants from the territory of former Yugoslavia (including Slovenia
and Croatia); these are not included in the group of immigrants from new EU members
(which come from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary,
Bulgaria, Romania, Malta and Cyprus).b: Trade, Transportation and Communication
(TTC).
In table 3.1, we compare socioeconomic groups in the population, in the sample, and in
the neighborhoods and super-neighborhoods of the sampled persons. The groups con-
sidered here correspond to the covariates in our estimations. The countries and groups
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of countries are the largest immigrant groups and those who traditionally came to Ger-
many as guest-workers (southern European countries). Therefore we expect those groups
to have formed particularly strong networks in Germany. As table 3.1 shows, the 2%
sample is almost identical to the population with respect to observable characteristics.
3.4 Empirical Design
Our goal is to compare the propensity of working together when living in the same
exact neighborhood with the propensity of working together when not living in the
same neighborhood but only sharing a broader reference area, the super-neighborhood.
Our empirical design allows to identify a social interaction effect based on within super-
neighborhood variation. The baseline model can be summarized as follows:
W aij = ρs + α0Rnij + εij with a = {n, f} (3.1)
W aij is an indicator for individuals i and j (who live in the same super-neighborhood)
to share the same workplace. W aij takes on the values 0 or 100 so that parameters
are directly interpretable as changes in percentage points. We differentiate W aij over
a = {n, f}: First, we follow Bayer et al. (2008) and set Wnij = 100 if a pair works in the
same neighborhood n.11 We refer to this case as Referral to a neighborhood. Second, we
use exact information on the establishments. We define W fij = 100 if a pair of individuals
works at the same firm f and call this case Referral to a firm.
All specifications are estimated with heteroscedasticity and cluster robust standard er-
rors12. Rnij is equal to 1 if both i and j live in the same grid cell and zero other-
wise. We can interpret α0, our social interaction effect, as the increase in probability
of working together when sharing a neighborhood. ρs denotes a fixed effect for the
super-neighborhood. It deals with sorting into residential location, a major issue of
the neighborhood effects literature. Sorting causes selection bias due to correlation
in unobservable factors in neighborhoods (such as amenities or the access to public
transportation). α0 can be identified as the social interaction effect if the two key
assumptions are fulfilled: First, social interaction within a neighborhood is a local phe-
nomenon. Second, individuals are able to choose their residential location freely across
super-neighborhoods but are randomly located within, such that there is no correlation
in unobservable characteristics affecting both work place and residential location within
a super-neighborhood.
11A workplace area has size 1km×1km as to allow for manufacturing establishments (which occupy
more space than most services) to be in the same area.
12Following Angrist and Pischke (2009), including robust standard errors deals with most of the prob-
lems when applying an LPM. Additional to the more straight forward interpretation of LPM estimating
e.g. a Probit model would make computation infeasible given the extent of the data set.
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To meet the requirement of the latter assumption, Bayer et al. (2008) argue that on a
very local level, the housing market is comparably thin. When individuals are choosing
their residential location, it may be hard to observe variation on a neighborhood level,
whereas it is easier to see this variation between the larger super-neighborhoods. Fur-
thermore, with 500m length a neighborhood is considerably small. It is not necessarily
the case that one can find a suitable dwelling given an appropriate search period in
a preferred small neighborhood, but rather has to look for something in a more spa-
cious area (such as the super-neighborhood). Germans in general are less mobile than
US Americans: 16% of Germans change their residence within two years and only 9%
moved within a city (Bo¨ltken et al., 2013),which gives rise to the assumption that the
housing market is thin enough even within cities. Besides, the overlapping structure
of our super-neighborhood design should additionally contribute to meet this criterion:
Even if there is sorting within super-neighborhoods, sampling each small grid cell up
to 9 times should substantially reduce the remaining sorting. This is a clear advantage
compared to Bayer et al. (2008) and Schmutte (2015), who use predefined fixed census
block groups as a reference group.
As outlined in Section 3.2, previous findings emphasize the differing importance of infor-
mal networks among socioeconomic groups. To account for those differences, we include
individual characteristics.
W aij = ρs + β′(Xi − X¯) + (α0 + α′1(Xi − X¯))Rnij + εij with a = {n, f} (3.2)
We investigate how belonging to a socioeconomic group adds to the propensity of working
together. α1 depicts the effect of being part of a particular group and working together -
a “one-sided” social interaction effect. To interpret the effect of sharing a neighborhood
at the mean of the categorical variables X, we center all covariates around zero.13 We
use categorical variables for personal characteristics such as sex, age groups14, skill
groups15, categories of nationality, different industries, and a control for the size of the
neighborhood. β can be interpreted as the baseline propensity of residing in the same
super-neighborhood (but not sharing an immediate neighborhood) on working together
for different characteristic groups (Xi).
W aij = ρs + β′(Xij − X¯) + (α0 + α′1(Xij − X¯))Rnij + εij with a = {n, f} (3.3)
13Wooldridge (2002) argues that subtracting the sample mean from each component allows identifi-
cation of α0 as the average treatment effect of Rij on the dependent variable.
14Young adults from 15-24, career entrants aged 25-34, those established in the work force from 35-54
and senior workers between 55 and 65 years.
15Low skilled refers to lower secondary education with and without apprenticeship. Medium skilled
individuals have higher secondary education (German “Abitur”), with and without apprenticeship. The
high skilled group refers to individuals with a university degree.
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In equation 3.3, we examine whether the propensity of working together varies with
the characteristics of a pair (as opposed to the individual characteristic measured by
equation 3.2). With this specification, we test whether e.g. more similar pairs are
more likely to profit from social interaction and whether certain groups have higher
probabilities to work together.
3.5 Results
Table 3.2 summarizes the results from our baseline model as presented in Section 3.4. Es-
timating unconditionally (without super-neighborhood fixed effects) gives an impression
on the baseline probability of working together16: when residing in the same super-
neighborhood the probability of working in the same neighborhood is 1.8% and 0.22%
for working in the same firm. Estimating equations 3.1-3.3 can then be interpreted as
an increase in this baseline probability by residing in the same neighborhood.
Column (1) corresponds to equation 1, where sharing a neighborhood is the single ex-
planatory variable. The social interaction effect is positive and highly significant for
both cases of a = (n, f). Thus there is evidence for a positive impact of sharing a resi-
dential neighborhood on the propensity to work together in the same neighborhood as
well as on the propensity to work in the same firm. For a referral to a neighborhood
(a = n), the probability of working together is increased by 0.14 percentage points, which
corresponds to an increase of 8%. Despite the different definition of neighborhoods the
magnitude of the social interaction effect is similar compared to the 0.12 percentage
points estimated by Bayer et al. (2008).
Interpreting the referral to a firm is a better indication for an actual job referral. The
estimated absolute social interaction effect is somewhat smaller as compared to the refer-
ral to neighborhood effect, albeit still positive and highly significant. The probability for
neighbors to work at the same firm increases by 0.07 percentage points. This is equiva-
lent to a 30% increase in probability compared to the unconditional baseline probability
which is much larger than in the case of a referral to a neighborhood. Therefore referrals
to a firm not only reflect an actual referral more realistically, but also are economically
more meaningful.
Columns (2) and (3) refer to equation 3.2 and equation 3.3, where we are interested
in how the social interaction effect reacts first for different socioeconomic groups and
second for pairs of socioeconomic groups. For expositional purpose, we only report joint
significance in this table; full outputs are presented in the appendix. Noteworthy, the
social interaction effect α0 is relatively stable across specifications. Column (2) shows
16Here, we estimate W aij = α0 + α1Rnij + εij and interpret α0 as the baseline probability of working
together when sharing the same super-neighborhood.
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the one-sided interaction effect. Here, only some of the interactions are jointly signif-
icant: There is no statistically significant differential effect of sharing a neighborhood
varying by qualification, age group or gender both for referrals to neighborhoods and to
firms. An individual’s own ethnicity17 and industry18 generate significant variation in
the referral effect. The larger the neighborhood i lives in, the smaller the referral effect;
this corresponds to the decreasing likelihood of interaction the more people live in one
neighborhood.
Column (3) describes how pairs of certain groups interact in residential neighborhoods.
Xij describes the propensity to work together when sharing a super-neighborhood: We
find higher propensities for young and old pairs of workers, as well as unskilled pairs
and matches for several industry sectors. In contrast, there is almost no effect for ethnic
groups. Again the interaction term determines the local referral effect. Apart from age
groups, the impact of all categories are jointly significant which means that grouping
pairs with respect to socioeconomic categories at least plays some role for job referrals.
The interaction effects (α1 in equation 3.3) can be interpreted as the additional effect
of being both in the same socioeconomic group and sharing a neighborhood. There are
no big differences across gender and age groups (meaning that the interaction effects
are either small or insignificant). Consistent with the literature on informal job markets
(e.g. Hellerstein et al. (2011) or Kramarz and Nordstro¨m Skans (2014) among others),
pairs of unskilled workers have a comparatively high propensity to work together both
at the same neighborhood and at the same firm. For different ethnic groups the ef-
fect varies, too: Especially for people from the new EU countries, the probability to
work together increases by over 20% as compared to Germans (the reference group)
both for referrals to neighborhoods and referrals to firms. Also Italians and people from
former Yugoslavia show stronger referral effects. In contrast, albeit being the biggest
migrant group in Germany, Turkish do not seem to behave differently from Germans,
with the interaction effect being insignificant. For the different types of industries19, the
propensity to work together is increased in a similar way across groups. The size of the
residential neighborhood of pairs seems to have no effect on working together; it has a
significant negative effect on the interaction (the referral), however. We interpret this
as decreasing probability to meet when living in a higher populated neighborhood, in
17The effect differs between referrals to neighborhoods, where Greeks have the most significant increase
in probability of working together, and referrals to neighborhoods, where Turks seem to profit the most
from referral effects. For all other groups, the effects are positive but rather noisy.
18Compared to women working in manufacturing, working in all other industry sectors has a negative
effect on working together when sharing a neighborhood, with business related services having the largest
and most significant effect.
19An exception is the Primary Sector. Here the increase in propensity to work together can probably
be accounted for – at least to some extent – by disproportionately many people living very close to their
workplace.
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line with Calvo´-Armengol and Zenou (2005)20.
We use a linear model for computational reasons. A potential concern on the specifi-
cation is estimating a linear model does not accurately reflect potential non-linearities
in the propensity of working together and therefore overstates the true network effect.
We therefore calculate linear predictions of Wˆij using equation 3.2 and 3.3. We find the
mean and median predicted probability to be close to the baseline probability of working
together in a super-neighborhood. We interpret this as an indication for an LPM being
a suitable specification.
3.6 Robustness
We argue that the key assumption for identification, no correlation in unobservables
affecting work location within a super-neighborhood, is reasonable. Following Altonji
et al. (2005), selectivity in observables is proportional to selectivity in unobservables and
an indication of sorting. Therefore, we first analyze the sorting behavior with respect to
observable characteristics. We compute correlations of observable characteristics (age
groups, gender, nationality groups, skill groups and industry groups) for both pairs that
reside in a neighborhood together and for pairs who share a super-neighborhood but are
not immediate neighbors. The correlations are expressed as E(Di 1ni ∑jDj) = E(Xij)
and characterized by the expected value of observing two individuals i and j belonging to
the same groupD21, and test whether they differ between neighbors and super-neighbors.
Table B.1 in appendix B presents correlations on the basis of observables. We see no sys-
tematic differences, with the super-neighborhood having slightly less correlations. This
suggests sorting on the basis of observables but no difference in the patterns of sorting
between neighborhoods and super-neighborhoods. Apart from that, especially Turkish,
people from former Yugoslavia and the new EU countries sort themselves together into
neighborhoods. In contrast, immigrants from other southern European countries tend
to sort away from each other. This is remarkable considering the interpretation of the
interaction effects presented above: Turkish, who seem to sort themselves together do
not tend to be more likely to work together. In contrast, Italians and Spanish who have
an increased probability to work together tend to sort away from each other22. This
indicates that although we find some sorting in observables, it does not seem to bias our
interaction estimates systematically.
20Calvo´-Armengol and Zenou (2005) show in a matching framework, that the probability of finding a
job increases with network size up to a critical value, where the job finding probability decreases.
21Therefore some of the correlations are very high just because the group is comparatively big, which
is why the probability to be matched into a pair with your own group is high.
22The very high positive effect for new EU migrants, however, seems to be inflated by positive sorting
bias. Nevertheless, as it is big and statistically highly significant, we believe that referrals should still
play a role for them.
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Second, we analyze whether there is sorting within super-neighborhoods with respect to
unobservables. The residuals from estimating equation 3.2 represent everything which
is unobservable with respect to the choice of residential and working location. We there-
fore use them as a proxy for sorting on the basis of unobservables. By construction,
the residuals should have an average value of zero on the basis of super-neighborhoods.
We compare the mean residuals for those pairs sharing a neighborhood (i.e. Rij = 1)
within each super-neighborhood with those sharing a super-neighborhood but not its
core (Rij = 0). This gives a direct test for sorting on the basis of unobservables. For the
estimation of a referral to a neighborhood in specification (1) (estimation of equation
(3.1)), the 1st percentile of the neighborhood-specific averages is -1.11 and the 99th
percentile is 2.33, for referrals to a firm none of these values is far away from zero, as
compared to the variation of the fixed effects (see table 3.2). If we control for covariates
in specifications 2 and 3, these averages become even closer to zero. Therefore, we con-
clude that we can reject sorting on the basis of unobservables affecting both workplace
and residential location within super-neighborhoods. This means that our empirical
design deals successfully with self selection of residential location, the most important
issue in identification of neighborhood effects.
3.6.1 Reverse Causality
Another concern is the possibility of reverse causality. Instead of neighbors referring
each other for a job, what we observe could also be the result of coworkers recommend-
ing each other their residential neighborhood. To check which direction of the effect
is the most plausible, we select four different subsamples and re-estimate equation 3.1.
The results are presented in table 3.3. As the IEB is only geocoded in 2008, we have to
rely on geographic information in form of zip codes two years prior to our main sample,
in 2006. Zip codes refer to districts within cities. The residential areas in this specifica-
tion are larger than those of our main specification but still represent movements within
cities.
First, in a subsample of “residential stayers”23, the estimate for a referral to a neighbor-
hood (a = n) rises slightly to 0.1552 percentage points and .0828 for referrals to a firm
(a = f). The constant rises, too, which is associated with an overall increase in prob-
ability of working together. This is due to the fact that restricting the sample to only
residential stayers mainly excludes pairs not working together. The relative increase24
is very similar for both types of referrals being slightly smaller than in the baseline
specification with the whole sample.
23People who have been living in the same zip code area for the last two years.
24As we use different subsamples for this exercise, we use the constants for each estimation as a baseline
probability to calculate the relative increase here.
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Second, we use a subset of “job movers”25: We select only pairs of which one individual
has changed the workplace (defined as the zip code where an individual works). For
both referrals to a neighborhood and to a firm the absolute effect is very close to the one
estimated with the whole sample whereas there is an increase in the relative probability
for a referral to a firm.
Third, we select individuals, who have all lived in the same zip code in the last two
years and use only pairs of which one individual has changed the working location, i.e.
“residential stayers with a job move”. Here, the absolute effect decreases slightly for
both kinds of referrals but remains statistically significant26. It is worth noting that
while there is a slight decrease in the relative effect for referrals to a neighborhood,
the relative effect for firms increases to 49%. In this group the observed correlation is
most likely to be caused by a job referral. One of the pair has been searching a job in
the previous two years while both stayed at their joint neighborhood. The estimated
absolute referral effects in the baseline specification and in this restricted sample are not
statistically different from each other (for both cases of a = {n, f}). This again makes
us confident that the social interaction effect we find is indeed a job referral effect.
Finally, we select a subsample where it is most likely to observe a referral on the housing
market: We use pairs of which one individual has lived in the zip code area for the last
two years while the other has changed residence. At the same time, both individuals
have worked in the same zip code area during that period. So within the pair ij, there
is one change in residential location but no change in employment for both. In this
circumstance the estimated social interaction effect is most likely caused by coworkers
exchanging information on the housing market. The absolute effect of Rij is increased
and highly significant both for a = n and a = f . Nevertheless the sample size is consider-
ably smaller than in all other cases and the sample seems to be inherently different from
those before: The magnitude of the constant suggests, that by selecting this specific
subsample, we exclude primarily individuals not working together (i.e. zeros for Wij),
which could be a reason why the estimated absolute interaction effect is bigger than
in the estimation with the whole sample. For referrals to a neighborhood, the baseline
probability of working together when sharing a super-neighborhood increases by 15%
compared to the estimation with the whole sample. For referrals to a firm it even in-
creases by 50%. Apart from that, people in this subsample should differ from those in
the whole sample, as we explicitly select individuals with a stable employment. The
relative increase is larger in case of a referral to a neighborhood but with 29.89% for a
25This specification includes individuals who move to find a new job. It is not directly interpretable
as a exclusion of reverse causality but should give us a more precise feeling for the magnitude of the
third effect.
26This subsample differs from the whole sample, which is why we should not suspect the effect to be
as big as that for the whole sample: This is in line with Bayer et al. (2008), who find a social interaction
effect of 0.09 percentage points for job movers.
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referral to a firm considerably smaller, especially when compared to the case where a
job market referral is most likely.
Although we can not rule out reverse causality completly, we find evidence for a referral
effect in a case the job referral is most likely. Besides, we want to emphasize the impor-
tance of distinguishing between referrals to a neighborhood and a firm: Not only does
the latter reflect theoretical considerations of a referral effect more closely (see Section
3.2), but this specification also seems to be more stable and less susceptible to bias than
the case of a referral to a neighborhood.
3.6.2 Random Reassignment to Jobs
Is it possible that the correlation we observe is induced by something other than referrals
by neighbors? Workplaces are neither evenly nor randomly allocated over space. They
follow a certain structure because firms settle up more frequently in the central busi-
ness district, subcentral business districts, or particular business zones (see e.g. Fujita
et al. (1999) for an overview). As a consequence, a certain correlation with regard to
workplaces may arise because people optimize their commuting distance. In order to dis-
entangle this spurious correlation from the correlation due to job referrals, we randomly
reassign a workplace neighborhood to persons i according to the workplace probabilities
in their super-neighborhood. To do so, we determine for each super-neighborhood s
the specific relative frequencies (i.e. the probabilities) for each workplace neighborhood,
pn∣s, with cumulated frequencies Fn∣s = ∫ ⋃m∈[1,...,n]pm∣s. The frequencies add up to the
unit interval as ∫ ⋃n∈[1,...,N]pn∣s = 1. Then we draw from a uniform distribution for each
person i. The realization of this draw corresponds to a unique workplace n specific parti-
tion on the unit interval (as {ui ∈ (Fn−1∣s, Fn∣s]}↦ n) which determines a counterfactual
workplace for each person i. Then we can construct a new variable for the hypothetical
workplace coincidence, W˜nij , and re-estimate equation 3.1:
W˜nij = ρs + α0Rij + εij (3.4)
The spurious correlation due to clusters in employment is positive and statistically
highly significant. Nevertheless, the magnitude of both the absolute and relative effect
is small compared to the baseline specification in table 3.2. All in all, this indicates
that what we measure as a referral effect using Bayer et al. (2008)’s design (referral
to a neighborhood) is probably slightly inflated by clusters in employment. Again we
emphasize the superiority of our additional specification with referrals to a firm.
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Table 3.4: Baseline Estimation for artificial Workplaces
Variable W˜nij
Constant 1.8195∗∗∗
(.0016)
Rij .0278
∗∗∗
(.0104)
Relative increase [1.52%]
σu 2.1095
σε 13.2895
# pairs 155.7 Mio
# groups 11,376
Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses. [ ]
gives increase in probability of working together. ∗/∗∗/∗∗∗mark
significance at the 90%/95%/99% confidence level. W˜nij denotes
the counterfactual probability of working together. Note: Here
we only estimate artificial referrals to a neighborhood.
Table 3.5: Firm Size Effects for Referrals to a Neighborhood
Variable Small firms Small f. males Medium firms Large firms
Constant 1.8344∗∗∗ 1.764∗∗∗ 1.4818∗∗∗ 2.0055∗∗∗
(.0018) (.0025) (.0016) (.0074)
Rij .1300
∗∗∗ .1062∗∗∗ .0756∗∗∗ .1490∗∗∗
(.0115) (.0160) (.0105) (.0477)
Relative increase [7.1%] [9.0%] [5.1%] [7.4%]
σu 3.3893 1.6823 3.4128 4.3674
σε 13.4182 10.7988 12.0897 13.9568
# pairs 74.2 Mio 18.1 Mio 47.3 Mio 59.8 Mio
# groups 10,785 9,343 10,474 10,535
Corr(u,Xb) -.0090 -.0052 -.0058 .0048
Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses. [ ] gives increase in prob-
ability of working together ∗/∗∗/∗∗∗mark significance at the 90%/95%/99% confidence
level. Small firms: < 50 employees, medium: 50-249 employees, large: ≥250 employees.
3.6.3 Firm size effects
Another issue closely related is a potential firm size effect: Does the high correlation of
living together and working together come from people working in large establishments?
To rule out another form of spurious correlation, we estimate our baseline specification
for three different subsets. First, we re-estimate equation 3.1 for pairs of individuals of
whom the neighbors j are working in small firms (less than 50 employees). The second
category are medium sized firms, where j work in establishments with 50 to less than
250 employees. Third we look at a subset of neighbors who work in large establishments,
employing more than 250 people. Again we differentiate between referrals to a neigh-
borhood and to a firm.
Table 3.5 shows the probability of working in the same neighborhood when j works in
different sizes of establishments. We observe no systematic difference by firm size. Both
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Table 3.6: Firm Size Effects for Referrals to a Firm
Variable Small firms Small f. males Medium firms Large firms
Constant .0156∗∗∗ .01711∗∗∗ .0880∗∗∗ .5788∗∗∗
(.0001) (.0004) (.0013) (.0074)
Rij .0217
∗∗∗ .0233∗∗∗ .0418∗∗∗ .1275∗∗∗
(.0011) (.0023) (.0081) (.0472)
Relative increase [139.9%] [136.3%] [47.6%] [22.02%]
σu 1.7040 .5687 1.0772 4.3674
σε 1.3745 1.4367 3.0664 13.9568
# pairs 74.2 Mio 18.1 Mio 47.3 Mio 59.8 Mio
# groups 10,785 9,343 10,474 10,535
Corr(u,Xb) .0036 .0061 .0162 .0048
Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses. [ ] gives increase in prob-
ability of working together. ∗/∗∗/∗∗∗mark significance at the 90%/95%/99% confidence
level. Small firms: < 50 employees, medium: 50-249 employees, large: ≥250 employees.
absolute and relative increases in probability are fairly similar to our baseline specifica-
tion, with medium firms having the smallest effect. Working in the same neighborhood
with people from one’s super-neighborhood (constant) is most likely for large firms, an
indication of a size effect. Regarding the relative effect, the magnitude is in line with
our other specifications.
We are concerned of biased results in the small size category, because here we should
have many family businesses, where people work and live together as a result of being
part of the same household. As we cannot identify household affiliation in our data,
we estimate the equation for small firms for males only. For both specifications a = n
and a = f the results do not differ significantly from the unrestricted sample. More
interestingly, table 3.6 indicates huge and significant increases in the relative probability
of working in the same small firm. Excluding females from the sample does not change
this result, but leaves both absolute and relative effect unchanged. When j is working in
a medium size establishment, i’s absolute probability of working with j is comparable to
that in the whole sample. In case of large firms, the relative effects is smallest and least
precisely estimated27. Although we do not want to stress causal interpretation here, as
our subsets are selective, we see these results as a clear indication that our estimates
are not driven by a pure size effect meaning people are only working with their neigh-
bors because they all work in big firms. In contrast, small establishments seem to be
best suitable for referring someone from your network, maybe because employers rely
more heavily on informal referrals or because information flows easier in small plants.
This result is also in line with Hellerstein et al. (2011), Ioannides and Loury (2004) and
Pellizzari (2010).
27Albeit being significant on a 1% level, the 95% confidence interval of Rij goes from 0.0349 to 0.2201,
which is large considering the sample size.
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Table 3.7: Baseline Estimation excluding Short Distance Commuters
Variable a = n a = f
Constant 1.9528∗∗∗ .2390∗∗∗
(.0040) (.0041)
Rij .1298
∗∗∗ .0787∗∗∗
(.0269) (.0262)
Relative increase [6.64%] [32.92%]
σu 4.9131 2.2322
σε 13.8424 4.9754
# pairs 154.2 Mio 154.2 Mio
# groups 11,325 11,325
Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses. [ ] gives
increase in probability of working together. ∗/∗∗/∗∗∗mark significance at
the 90%/95%/99% confidence level.
3.6.4 Commuting
We now explicitly address the effect of commuting behavior. We are concerned that our
measured effect could be driven by a disproportionately high number of short distance
commuters. They locate close to their work place and hence have a high probability of
working with their neighbors. Therefore, we exclude everyone working in the same zip
code area they live in. We re-estimate equation 3.1 with this restricted sample to test
whether the coefficient of social interaction α0 differs significantly from that in the full
sample. The sample size drops moderately to 154.2 million pairs ij, which means our
restriction does not reduce the data set fundamentally. Furthermore, both the constant
and the social interaction effect remain at a comparable level. The baseline probability
of working together when sharing the same super-neighborhood (constant) is slightly
higher both for referrals to a neighborhood and referrals to a firm. The absolute effect
of Rij in contrast is slightly lower for a referral to a neighborhood, but still in a very
similar range with .13 versus .14 using the whole sample. For referrals to a firm, the
effect is marginally higher as compared to the estimation with the whole sample (.0787
versus .0746). Over all, the results stay very much the same, which suggests that short
distance commuters are not driving the referral effect and we do not observe a spurious
correlation here.
Even if people do not systematically work together because they minimize their commut-
ing distance (see Section 3.6.2), they could just as well be minimizing their commuting
time. Workers could sort close to access to junctions of public transportation which
likewise can lead to spurious correlation. We amend our data set with georeferenced
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data28 of all S-Bahn29 stations of the linked transport system Rhine-Ruhr30 (VRR),
which extends to the greatest part of the Rhine-Ruhr metropolitan area31. We investi-
gate whether the probability of working together and living together is increased, when
people work close to access in public transportation. We look at whether such “net-
works of commuters” increase the probability of working together when sharing the
same neighborhood. To check this, we estimate
W aij = ρs + β′(Sj − S¯) + (α0 + α′1(Sj − S¯))Rnij + εij with a = {n, f} (3.5)
where Sj = 1 if individual j works in a neighborhood that has an S-Bahn stop. A
positive value for β indicates an increase in the baseline probability of working together
at a workplace which is easier to access. The social interaction effect α1 is interpretable
as “network of commuters” effect, as it reflects the increase in probability of working
together when living in the same neighborhood if the commuting destination has an
S-Bahn stop32.
Table 3.8 shows the results of estimating equation 3.5. (1) indicates a subsample where
all ij work in the VRR area, (2) restricts the full data set to all ij living in the VRR
area and (3) uses the intersection of (1) and (2) where ij both work and live in the VRR
area. Using only the VRR region (instead of the whole Rhine-Ruhr area) still leaves us
with a large dataset.
When estimating the probability of working in the same neighborhood (a = n), we find
an increase in the baseline probability of working together in the same neighborhood if
that neighborhood has access to an S-Bahn station (Sj = 1). However, in the case of
referrals to a firm, the effect of Sj is statistically not different from zero in any of the
specifications.
The social interaction effect without access to a public transportation network Rij is a
bit smaller than in the baseline specification both for referrals to a neighborhood and
referrals to a firm, but still in a comparable range. What is more interesting though is
the interaction effect Sj×Rij : The probability of pairs to work in the same neighborhood
which has an S-Bahn stop is negative. This means, an S-Bahn stop at the workplace
actually reduces the probability of working together with your neighbor, which is in
28According to the addresses of S-Bahn stations, we assign them to their respective neighborhood
cells. If a station lies within multiple cells, we use the geometric centroid of the station to assign it to
the corresponding neighborhood.
29S-Bahn is a German commuter rail network that serves within city centers and suburbs nearby big
cities. The S-Bahn is usually faster and serves a larger area than the U-Bahn or metro.
30Verkehrsverbund Rhine-Ruhr (VRR). See http://www.vrr.de/en/ for further information.
31The VRR encompasses with the Ruhr region, the Niederrhein, Wuppertal, Remscheid, Solingen and
Du¨sseldorf the biggest part of the Rhine Ruhr area. Only the South (with Cologne and Bonn) and the
North East are not included in this public transportation network.
32Controlling in the same fashion for S-Bahn stops at the place of residence is impossible as the
information on the presence of a station (within a super-neighborhood) will be absorbed by the super-
neighborhood fixed effect.
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contrast to the interpretation of the “network of commuters”. Nevertheless we should
interpret this result with caution: Although two out of three specifications are significant
at a 1% level, the measurement of the effects is imprecise with rather big confidence
intervals compared to other specifications. Estimating the probability of working in
the same establishment with access to public transportation and living in the same
neighborhood also yields negative signs, but none of the specifications are statistically
different from zero. A reason for the negative sign could be the fact that S-Bahn stations
take up a lot of space which reduces the probability to work in a 500×500m grid cell
together, where there is also a public transport station. Overall our analyses do not
support the hypothesis that commuting is a source of bias to our estimates of a residence
based referral effect and that – especially in our preferred specification with a = f – we
find very similar results when excluding short distance commuters and no significant
results when conditioning on access to public transportation.
3.7 Discussion
Most of the empirical work on neighborhood and referral effects so far has been on US
American data; in contrast, we look at residence based referral effects for the Rhine-
Ruhr area, one of the biggest agglomerations in Europe. We use the empirical design
proposed by Bayer et al. (2008) to compare propensities to work together when sharing
an immediate neighborhood while holding the surrounding neighboring area constant.
This allows us to identify a social interaction effect using the within variation of the
so-called super-neighborhoods.
The results of our baseline specification are very similar to those for the Boston metropoli-
tan area: We significantly estimate the probability to work with a neighbor to be 0.14
percentage points while Bayer et al. (2008) find the effect to be 0.12 percentage points.
So the first question whether the extent of referral effects based on residential location
differs for a European country as compared to the US can be denied: Although we use
a different definition of neighborhood and super-neighborhood, we find very similar re-
sults.
Novel geo-coded data further allow us to differentiate referral effects as a “referral to
firm” effect which is a much more precise measure consistent with theoretical considera-
tions on job referrals. The absolute effect is about 0.07 percentage points and somewhat
smaller than the referral to a neighborhood. However, the relative increase is with over
30% as compared to 8% larger and hence economically more meaningful. We interpret
this referral to a firm as the more precise measure for job referrals, as information on
available jobs is restricted mostly to one’s own firm. Additionally, the effect seems to
be even more stable across specifications. Hence, we argue that the previous literature
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understates actual network effects.
The referral effects are even stronger for similar pairs especially of the same nationality.
This finding is in line with the literature of immigrantion and integration and also sup-
ports my interpretation from chapter 2: E.g. Glitz (2014) shows substantial immigrant
segregation both in workplaces and in residential location in Germany, which varies for
groups of immigrants. Segregation in residential location seems to be independent of
qualification, whereas segregation in workplaces is more present for low qualified immi-
grants. Here, we can differentiate residential locations in much more detail due to the
geocoded data and we see that some ethnicities sort themselves together (see table B.1)
and also show an increased propensity to work together. Therefore the presumption of
chapter 2 and its effects are supported by our findings in this chapter.
Our estimates for referral effects are stable across various specifications such that we
can exclude several other explanations besides a job referral effect. We find that there
is no sorting on the basis of unobservables within super-neighborhoods. This means
that including the fixed effects should deal with the issue of self selection into residential
location, the greatest threat to empirical studies on neighborhood effects.
Although we cannot rule out completely the possibility of a bias in our estimated refer-
ral effect due to simultaneity, we argue that it is very plausible that what we observe
accounts for an actual referral effect on the job market. We find very similar results for
a subset of individuals, for whom job referrals are most likely.
We amend the previous literature by explicitly checking for clusters in employment and
find positive and significant spurious correlation of 0.03 percentage points due to the
geographical distribution of workplaces. However, the greater portion can be attributed
to an actual referral effect.
We find no evidence that our estimates of referral effects are driven by many people
working in large firms. In contrast, we find that the relative effect is extremely high for
referrals to a small firm, which suggests that for small businesses informal job market
channels are most important (which is in line with e.g. Hellerstein et al. (2011) Ioannides
and Loury (2004) and Pellizzari (2010)).
Finally, we analyze the role of commuting on our referral effect. Neither short distance
commuters nor networks of commuters seem to be the drivers of our measured referral
effect.
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Chapter 4
The Distributional Effect of
Commuting Subsidies
4.1 Introduction
Tax laws in most OECD countries foresee some kind of tax break for commuting. Un-
derlying these regulations are usually both efficiency and equity considerations. On the
one hand, commuting subsidies are intended to increase efficiency in the labor market
by encouraging workers to augment their radius of job search and to commute further
for a better match (Borck and Wrede (2009)).1 On the other hand, equity considera-
tions require that workers willing to accept longer commuting distances should not be
disadvantaged financially (Borck and Wrede (2005)).
Compared to the efficiency aspect, little is known about the distributional consequences
of commuting subsidies.2 In this paper we provide new and consistent evidence on the
distributional effects of commuting subsidies. Using precise information on commuting
distances of about two million workers, we draw on a unique policy reform in Ger-
many. Commuting subsidies were reduced substantially in 2007 for workers commuting
14 kilometers or more while leaving workers with lower commuting distances unaffected.
With 2.5 billion Euro of additional tax revenues annually (Donges et al., 2008), these
1Commuting subsidies are usually designed as deductions of commuting expenses from taxable in-
come. As such, they offset negative effects from income tax on job search and commuting decisions
(Richter et al., 2004). In a simple example, let ∆w be the wage premium for commuting and c the
commuting cost. In the absence of taxation commuting will take place if ∆w − c > 0. Sufficiently high
income taxes t will inhibit commuting since ∆w(1− t)− c < 0. If, however, commuting is tax deductible,
every efficient job match will be achieved even under taxation since (∆w − c)(1 − t) > 0 holds as long as
∆w − c > 0.
2A substantial body of theoretical literature examines how commuting subsidies should be designed
in order to reach an efficient level of job search and commuting (see, e.g., Wrede (2001) and Richter
(2006)). Weiss (2009) and Boehm (2013) both provide empirical evidence that workers commute longer
distances if they can offset commuting expenses against income tax.
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abrupt changes in the tax regime were not only substantial in size but have also led
to a large shift of a major kink in the tax scheme. In our identification approach we
exploit the exogenous variation in commuting subsidies induced by the reform. Using
a difference-in-differences strategy we first examine whether workers are compensated
by their employer for the net wage losses they incur as a result of the partial repeal
of commuting subsidies. Empirically, the existence and the size of compensation pay-
ments are ex-ante unclear, as they depend on multiple factors: The mobility of workers
and firms and the market structure on the demand and supply side (Manning (2003)),
the level of information that firms possess (Zenou (2006), Ross and Zenou (2008)), the
propensity of workers to shirk (van Ommeren and Gutie´rrez-i Puigarnau (2011)), the
relative bargaining power of workers (Rupert et al. (2009)) as well as the extent to which
wages are flexible enough to adjust to worker-specific circumstances (Baldry (1998)).
If workers are not (fully) compensated for commuting costs by their employers, commut-
ing subsidies effectively reduce the financial burden of commuters. The question from
an equity perspective is then how the benefits from commuting subsidies are distributed
between different groups of workers. While it is mostly assumed that high-wage workers
benefit more than proportionally from the subsidy due to higher marginal income tax
rates and longer commuting distances (Bach, 2007), little is known about the specific
distribution of benefits from commuting subsidies across wage groups.3 In addition, we
lack an understanding of the spatial component of commuting subsides, i.e., of the ex-
tent to which income is redistributed from cities to rural areas or vice versa. This effect
is ex-ante ambiguous since workers living in the countryside commute longer distances
while at the same time they earn less compared to workers living in urban areas (see
Glaeser and Mare´ (2001), among others, on the existence of urban wage premia) and are
hence subject to lower marginal tax rates. In the second part of the paper, we therefore
shed light on the distribution of benefits from commuting subsidies between workers of
different wage groups and between regions by degree of agglomeration.
A precise estimation of these distributional effects becomes possible through the avail-
ability of a large and novel data set which contains geo-referenced information on the
exact place of work and place of residence of each worker. Drawing on this data and
using GIS-software, we construct an accurate worker-specific measure of real commuting
distances, which has not been available so far. Combining this measure with information
on gross wages of about two million workers per year allows for determining changes in
individual net wages as a result of the partial repeal of commuting subsidies.
We contribute to the literature in three major respects. First, we shed light on the
3In 2010, the German Green Party expressed their concern that commuting subsidies favor mainly
higher income groups in an official inquiry to the Federal Government (“Kleine Anfrage an die
Bundesregierung zur Verteilungswirkung der Entfernungspauschale”, Bundesministerium der Finanzen
(2010)). In its response, the Government stated that information on the correlation between personal
income and the size of individual tax breaks for commuting costs is not available.
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question whether workers or employers effectively benefit from the substantial sum that
is spent annually on commuting subsidies4 and how these benefits are distributed across
different groups of workers. Second, we provide an estimate of the extent to which
workers are compensated for commuting costs by their employers.5 The results from
this estimate also provide a test of the urban efficiency wage models proposed by Zenou
and Smith (1995) and Zenou (2006). Third, understanding the distributional effects of
the reform allows to infer on the equity effects of the two major regimes of commuting
subsidies prevailing in different countries. In countries like, e.g., Finland and Norway,
commuting costs can be deducted without a lower bound on commuting distances while
Sweden, Denmark, and Austria among others foresee tax deductions only for distances
above a certain threshold (see Potter et al. (2006) and Borck and Wrede (2009) for an
overview). The German case is unique inasmuch as both regimes were consecutively im-
plemented within one country. We exploit this rare opportunity to consistently estimate
the distributional effect of a paradigm shift in the design of commuting subsidies.
The results show that workers are only imperfectly compensated by their employers for
the losses in net wages they incur as a result of the partial repeal of commuting sub-
sidies. Overall, we find no evidence for gross wage adjustments for the full sample of
workers. For workers mostly uncovered by collective wage agreements, however, the re-
sults suggest the existence of compensatory payments in the magnitude of eight percent
of the net wage losses workers incur as a result of the reform. Overall, these results
indicate that commuting costs are largely borne by workers. With respect to the dis-
tribution of benefits between worker groups, we find that commuting subsidies strongly
favor high-earning workers and workers in rural areas. Consistently, these workers have
largely carried the costs of the reform. This result is instructive because it shows that
granting tax breaks only above a certain threshold of commuting distances lessens the
regressive effect of commuting subsidies and yields a more equal distribution of benefits
from commuting subsidies between regions.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 4.2 we outline the design of commuting
subsidies in Germany before and after the reform in greater detail. In Section 4.3 we
summarize the data and provide descriptive statistics. In Section 4.4 we outline the
difference-in-differences design we employ as our key identification approach to examine
whether wage compensations are paid to workers affected by the reform and provide the
results from the estimation. In Section 4.5 we shed light on the distribution of benefits
4In Germany, the sum of foregone tax revenues from tax breaks on commuting amounts to 4.5 billion
Euro annually (Bundesministerium der Finanzen (2010)), which corresponds to 0.4% of overall public
expenditures.
5In this regard, the paper is similar to Mulalic et al. (2013), who use firm relocation as a source
of exogenous variation in commuting costs. The reform of commuting subsidies we draw on provides,
however, not only a larger shock in terms of net wages, but also affects a much larger number of workers.
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across wage groups and between workers in urban and rural regions, and discuss the dis-
tributional consequences of the two major paradigms of commuting subsidies prevailing
in OECD countries. Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 The Reform of Commuting Subsidies in Germany be-
tween 2004 and 2009
The reform of commuting subsidies we draw on in this paper was implemented between
2006 and 2007. Before 2007, commuting costs were legally considered as income-related
expenses, i.e., as necessary costs incurred by workers for taking up and sustaining a
specific employment. Analogous to the taxation of self-employed, where costs reduce
taxable revenues, workers could offset a lump-sum of 920 Euro per year for income-
related expenses against tax. If these expenses exceeded a total of 920 Euro, workers
could alternatively deduct 0.30 Euro per kilometer of a one-way commute per working
day from their taxable income. Tax authorities automatically apply the most favorable
option for each worker.
Facing the urgent need to consolidate an increasing deficit in public budgets (Deutscher
Bundestag, 2006), the German Parliament passed a reform of tax legislation on July
26th 2006, which stipulated a substantial reduction of foregone revenues from tax breaks
on commuting costs. The new law, which came into effect on January 1st 2007, can
be interpreted as a paradigm shift as it declared commuting to be privately caused
and as such not part of income-related expenses. As a result, while the lump-sum
regulation remained in effect, commuting costs exceeding an amount of 920 Euro were
not deductible anymore. However, as completely abolishing the subsidy above this
threshold was politically unfeasible, commuters traveling more than 20km per way were
still granted a tax exemption of 0.30 Euro per kilometer from the 21st kilometer onwards.
This was officially referred to as ‘hardship regulation’ (Ha¨rtefallregelung).
Figure 4.1 illustrates how the reform has altered the distribution of individual tax
breaks as a function of commuting distance. Under the pre-reform regime represented
by the solid line, individual tax savings from the per-kilometer deduction exceeded those
from the lump-sum of 920 Euro from the 14th kilometer onwards.6 Hence, workers with
commuting distances below 14km were assigned the lump-sum by tax authorities, while
workers commuting 14km or more between their places of residence and of work were
better off deducting 0.30 Euro per kilometer per work day.
6This value is calculated as 920/223*0.30=13.75, where 920 is the lump-sum, 223 the average number
of contractual working days for a full-time employee per year, and 0.30 Euro the deductible amount per
kilometer of a one-way commute per day. As the deduction is granted for full kilometers without
rounding, the deductible amount under the per-kilometer regulation exceeds the lump-sum from the
14th kilometer onwards.
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Figure 4.1: Policy Reform and Classification of Treatment and Control Group
Distance
Tax Break
Lump
Sum
Control Treatment
14km 34km
Until End of 2006
From 2007 on
By excluding the first 20km from tax deduction, the reform of commuting subsidies has
effectively shifted this kink upwards to a daily one-way commuting distance of 34km.
Workers commuting less than 14km per way were unaffected, as they claimed the lump-
sum both before and after the reform. In contrast, all workers with commuting distances
above this threshold experienced a reduction in commuting subsidies. As indicated by
the dashed line, workers commuting between 14 and 34km were assigned the lump-sum
after the reform rather than 0.30 Euro per kilometer. Workers commuting 34km or more
would claim the per-kilometer deduction under both regimes, but in the later period were
granted a deduction only from the 21st kilometer onwards.
We exploit this difference in the extent to which workers were affected by the reform to
identify how the benefits from commuting subsidies are distributed between workers and
firms. As explained in more detail in Section 4.4.1, we employ a difference-in-differences
design, where we classify workers commuting 14km or more as the treatment group, and
workers with commuting distances below 14km as the control group.
In December 2008, the Federal Constitutional Court declared the new regulation as
unconstitutional. It argued that treating commuting costs as income-related expenses
only for certain distances violates the general principle of equal treatment (Allgemeiner
Gleichbehandlungsgrundsatz ). After a period of controversial discussions on alternative
ways to bridge the gap between political feasibility and conformity with superordinate
law, the German Government repealed the reform in March 2009 and reinstituted the
scheme prevailing before 2007.
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4.3 Data and Descriptives
4.3.1 Data
For the analysis, we employ administrative data from the Federal Employment Agency
which are provided by the Institute for Employment Research in the IEB (Integrated Em-
ployment Biographies). The IEB contains information on all employed persons subject
to statutory social security contributions, as well as on all recipients of unemployment
insurance or unemployment assistance. For these persons, information on demographic
characteristics like education, age, gender, nationality, full-time vs. part-time employ-
ment, occupation, and wage, as well as on firm characteristics like establishment size
and industry classification are provided. Important for our purpose, the data set can
be extended upon special request by the exact geo-coordinates of each worker’s place of
living and place of work for the years 2007 to 2009 (see Scholz et al. (2012)).
We construct an annual panel of all full-time workers based on June 30th for each year.
From this panel, we draw a 25% random sample for 2006, the year before the reform was
implemented, and add all observations contained in the data for the years between 2004
to 2008. By excluding earlier and later years we account for the fact that the regime
of commuting subsidies has changed in 2003 and in 2009. In addition, we restrict the
sample in the following ways.
First, in order to avoid bias from selective sample attrition we include only individuals
with a full set of employment observations. Doing so we address the concern that older
workers who retire during the period of observation earn on average higher wages and
commute smaller distances than young workers entering the labor market. Without
this restriction, compensatory effects are likely to be underestimated due to changes
in the composition of the treatment and the control group between the pre- and the
post-reform period.
Second, we keep only workers with constant places of residence and work. This restric-
tion is necessary because geo-coordinates are only available for the years 2007 to 2009,
so we need to impute commuting distances for prior years.7 In addition, it accounts for
the finding that workers affected by the reform have a higher propensity to reduce their
commuting distance (Weiss (2009) and Boehm (2013)). If this option is predominantly
chosen by workers who have no prospect of successfully negotiating for a wage compen-
sation, their relocation would systematically alter the composition of the treatment and
control group and, as a result, lead to an overestimation of gross wage adjustments. This
condition also implies that workers do not change firms during the period of observation,
7We address the issue of missing geo-coordinates for the years 2004 to 2006 by keeping all workers who
do not change their county of residence (NUTS III) between 2004 and 2008 in the sample. With respect
to places of work, we keep workers with constant establishment ID and constant region of work during
this period. The latter restriction also accounts for the (rare) occasion of establishment relocation.
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which rules out any selectivity of job changes between treatment and control group and,
in particular, any confounding changes in wages from such selectivity.
Third, we exclude commuting distances that cannot realistically be covered on a daily
basis. This is particularly relevant in the present context, as long-distance commuters
often maintain a secondary residence in the region they work in. Since the geo-referenced
data contain only information on primary places of residences, including these workers
would lead to grossly overestimated commuting costs. We therefore exclude individuals
with commuting distances exceeding 200km, which applies to 1.3% of full-time workers.8
Finally, we address the fact that wages are censored at the upper limit of social security
contributions. In our sample, this applies to 5% of the observations. Imputing these
wages is not feasible because this precludes any potential wage adjustment at the time
of the reform, leading to an underestimation of wage effects. In order to avoid bias
from measurement error, we delete observations with wages on or above this ceiling (see
Reichert (2014)). All wages are deflated to the 2006 level.
The resulting data set is a balanced annual panel containing 9.99 million observations
on about two million workers for the years 2004 to 2008. For each of these workers, we
calculate both the Euclidean (‘as the crow flies’) and the shortest road distance between
place of residence and place of work using GIS software and drawing on street layers
provided by OpenStreetMap. The shortest road distance is stipulated by tax legislation
as the basis for calculating the tax break for commuting costs. We use the Euclidean
distance, which is independent from potentially inaccurate or incomplete maps, to detect
mismeasurement in the road distances, which might arise from imprecision in the maps
used in the GIS routine (mainly arising from private or unmarked roads in rural areas).
Both measures show a correlation of 0.995 and in less than 0.04% of the observations
the road distance is smaller than the Euclidian distance. We exclude these cases from
the sample. Based on road distances, we assign each individual to either the treatment
or the control group.
In order to examine the distribution of benefits from commuting subsidies across worker
groups in Section 4.5, we need to calculate the size of individual tax savings from com-
muting subsidies under both regimes. We therefore draw on the approach proposed by
Gunselmann (2014), to which we add individual commuting distances. The procedure
of deriving individual tax savings from information on gross wages and on commuting
distances is described in more detail in the C.
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Figure 4.2: Distribution of Commuting Distances
Note: Densities calculated based on Epanechnikov kernel; vertical lines indicate reform thresholds at
commuting distances of 14 and 34 kilometers, respectively.
4.3.2 Descriptives
Figure 4.2 contains the distribution of commuting distances for both road and Euclidian
distances. The average road distance (14.7km) exceeds the average Euclidian distance
(11.0km) by 34%. The two curves intersect slightly below the threshold of 14km. This
emphasizes the need to use true road distances instead of Euclidian distances, since
workers affected by the reform would otherwise incorrectly be assigned to the control
group. The fact that there is no indication for the existence of any kink or discontinuity
in the distribution supports the notion that the thresholds at 14 and 34km do not coin-
cide with any other salient points induced by other tax regulations, policies, or reforms.
Table 4.1 contains summary statistics of observable worker characteristics by treatment
status. The treatment and control group contain 865,582 and 1,133,010 workers, respec-
tively. With five observations per worker, the balanced panel encompasses 4.33 million
observations on treated and 5.67 million observations on untreated workers. Treated
workers are slightly younger, better qualified, and are employed in larger firms com-
pared to workers in the control group. The effect of the reform becomes evident in
the average amount that both groups can deduct before and after the reform. Workers
in the control group offset the lump-sum of 920 Euro against taxes in both years. In
contrast, workers in the treatment group deduct on average 3,412 Euro of commuting
8The results remain unchanged if we reduce this threshold to 100km.
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Table 4.1: Worker Characteristics by Treatment Status
Overall Control Treatment
No. Obs. 9.99 mio 5.67 mio 4.33 mio
(56.69%) (43.31%)
15-24 years 2.14% 2.24% 2.02%
25-34 years 17.16% 16.88% 17.54%
35-54 years 68.36% 67.71% 69.22%
55-64 years 12.33% 13.18% 11.21%
Low Qualification 12.19% 13.66% 10.27%
Medium Qualification 72.43% 71.60% 73.52%
High Qualification 5.85% 5.11% 6.83%
Mean Firm Size 278 188 395
Mean Tax Deduction (Euro)
2006 1,767 920 3,412
2007 1,197 920 1,734
Mean Tax Savings (Euro)
2006 302 160 578
2007 213 161 316
Mean Net Wage (Euro)
2006 19,374 18,557 20,959
2007 19,638 18,981 20,914
Mean Gross Wage (Euro)
2006 32,632 31,407 34,236
2007 33,052 31,780 34,716
expenses before, and only 1,734 Euro after the reform.9 Consistently, with 160 and 161
Euro, average net tax savings from commuting subsidies remain constant for workers in
the control group. For workers in the treatment group, tax savings fall from on average
578 Euro in 2006 to 316 Euro in 2007. As a result, while net wages rise by 2.3% for the
control group, they fall by 0.2% for the treatment group. In contrast, with an increase
of 1.4%, gross wages rise slightly more in the treatment group than in the control group
(1.2%).
9The value for the post-reform period compares well to the amount of 1,603 Euro reported by the
Federal Statistical Office as the average sum deducted in 2008 by all workers who do not claim the lump-
sum when offsetting their commuting expenses against tax (Destatis (2012)). The slightly smaller value
for the full sample is likely driven by part-time employed workers, who are excluded from our sample and
who exhibit smaller commuting distances than full-time workers (Van Ommeren and Rietveld (2005)).
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4.4 Commuting Subsidies and Gross Wage Compensation
4.4.1 Empirical Approach
We address the question whether workers are compensated by their employer for the net
wage losses they effectively incur as a result of the reform of commuting subsidies. We
apply a difference-in-differences (DID) approach where we exploit the fact that workers
are affected differently by changes in the legal regulation of tax breaks for commuting
costs. The treatment group consists of workers living away 14km or more from their
workplace, who from January 1st 2007 onwards cannot offset the first 20km against
tax anymore. The control group comprises all workers living closer than 14km from
their workplace, who claim the lump-sum deduction before and after the reform. If
employers compensate workers for losses in net wages resulting from the policy change,
gross wages in the post-reform period should rise significantly more for workers in the
treatment group compared to workers in the control group. We specify the following
DID model
log(grosswage)it = α + λdt + δ(T × d)it +X′itβ1 +Z′itβ2 + µi + εit (4.1)
where T is a dummy variable which equals one if the commuting distance of worker i
equals or exceeds 14 kilometers. dt denotes pre- and post-reform periods and takes a
value of one for the years 2007 and 2008.10 The matrices Xit and Zit contain observ-
able control variables on worker and firm-level, respectively. We control for unobserved
heterogeneity between workers by means of individual fixed effects µi, which also cap-
ture time-invariant firm characteristics since workers in the sample by definition do not
change firms. As a result, we effectively estimate the size of within-firm wage adjust-
ment for workers of different treatment status. Note that µi also captures the effect of
belonging to the treatment group because treatment status is constant over time as a
result of commuting distances being fixed. Standard errors are clustered on the level
of region of work in order to account for serial correlation (see Bertrand et al. (2004)
and Cameron and Miller (2011)). The coefficient of interest is δ, which multiplied by
100 measures the average change of gross wages in percentage points for treated workers
after the reform.
While the inclusion of fixed effects and other covariates accounts for systematically
higher wages of workers in the treatment group, it does not control for differences in
wage dynamic between both groups. Since such differential growth paths would pose
a threat to the common trend assumption, we also estimate equation (4.1) with the
10Note that since in 2006 the panel date (June 30th) precedes the day the reform was passed in
Parliament (July 26th), δ is unlikely to be biased by anticipation effects.
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dependent variable in first differences:
∆log(grosswage)it = α + λdt + δ(T × d)it +X′itβ1 +Z′itβ2 + µi + εit (4.2)
In the resulting equation (4.2), δ*100 measures the average change in the growth rate
of gross wages in percentage points for treated workers. We conduct placebo tests in
order to examine whether the common trend assumption is satisfied in either specifi-
cation. Before presenting the empirical results, we discuss two issues that might call
into question whether gross wages can be realistically expected to adjust to changes in
commuting subsidies.
First, one might doubt that wages adjust to reductions in commuting subsidies if pre-
dominantly negotiated by labor unions. Usually, collective wage agreements are closed
for longer periods of time and do not take into account peculiar circumstances of sub-
groups of workers. This view has recently been challenged by Dustmann et al. (2014)
and Card et al. (2013), who show that the influence of unions has declined decidedly
in Germany since the 1990s and that, as a result, the importance of worker- and firm-
specific pay premiums has increased substantially. In Section 4.4.2, we address this issue
by estimating equation (4.2) separately for workers employed in industries with a low
coverage rate of collective wage agreements.
Second, workers and firms might have expected the policy to be only of temporary na-
ture and therefore have not engaged in wage negotiations in the first place. The history
of the reform shows that over a period of nearly three years, i.e., between June 2006 and
March 2009, there was no indication that the pre-reform regime would be reinstated. In
January 2008, i.e., one and a half years after the reform was approved by the German
Parliament, the Federal Fiscal Court regarded the new law as unconstitutional. This
ruling was, however, not binding for the German Government and it took one more year
for the Federal Constitutional Court to confirm the decision in December 2008. With
another delay of three months, on March 19th 2009, the Parliament finally passed a law
which reinstituted the legal status prevailing before 2007. During this later period, the
future of commuting subsidies was unclear, with a full-scale abolition or a reduction to
0.10 Euro per kilometer being the most likely options discussed. Existing evidence on
intra-firm wage policies suggests that a period of three years suffices for workers and
firms to reach an agreement on how to share the burden of additional commuting costs.
In fact, a large literature starting with Baker et al. (1994) has shown that the rising
variation in individual wages is partly a result of wages reacting with increasing flexi-
bility to changes in external conditions. In addition, Bingley and Lanot (2002) provide
evidence that the costs of higher marginal tax rates are partially shifted from workers
to employers. Similarly and directly related to the case of commuting subsidies, Mulalic
et al. (2013) show that Danish firms compensate workers within a period of three years
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after an exogenous shock on commuting costs.
4.4.2 Results
The upper panel in Table 4.2 contains results from estimating equations (4.1) and (4.2)
for different samples of workers. The lower panel provides results from placebo tests,
where we restrict the sample period to the years 2004 to 2006 and artificially move the
date of the reform to January 1st 2006.
In column (1) we estimate equation (4.1) for the full sample. As indicated by the post-
dummy, wages (deflated to the 2006 level) have risen on average by 0.72% for all workers
in the post-reform period compared to the pre-reform years. The positive and significant
estimate for δ shows that the policy change has led to an additional average rise in gross
wages of 0.45% for workers affected by the reduction of commuting subsides. The result
from the placebo test in the lower panel indicates, however, that this is likely to be
driven by different growth paths of wages of treated and untreated workers. Although
the effect is 40% smaller in magnitude, a positive and significant wage effect remains for
a period where no reform has taken place. In the remaining columns we therefore use
wage growth rather than wage level as dependent variable.
For the full sample of workers in column (2), we find no evidence for a change in gross
wage growth in response to the reform. As discussed in Section 4.4.1, this insignificance
might be driven by workers whose wages are bound by collective wage agreements. We
test this presumption in column (3). Based on information on industry coverage provided
by the Federal Statistical Office (Destatis (2013b)), we estimate equation (4.2) only for
workers employed in industries where less than half of the workforce is covered by col-
lective wage agreements. For these workers, the results provide evidence for significant
wage adjustments in response to the reform. The point estimate of 0.0008 suggests that
wages of workers affected by reductions in commuting subsidies grow by additional 0.08
percentage points in the period after the reform. The size of these estimates is slightly
smaller than the findings by Mulalic et al. (2013), who provide evidence for gross wage
adjustments of about 0.15 percent for each additional kilometer after a firm relocation
over a period of three years. Since the average change in commuting distances in their
study is 1.2km, the average rise in gross wages amounts to 0.18 percentage points. As-
suming a linear adjustment process over time, after a period of two years wages should
have risen by 0.12 percentage points, which is comparable to our result for the two-year
period from 2007 to 2008.
The lower panel shows the results from placebo tests. None of the results in columns (2)
and (3) is statistically different from zero. In Figure 4.3 we additionally plot the average
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Figure 4.3: Gross Wage Growth by Treatment Status
Note: The figure shows average growth rates of gross wages by treatment status for the full sample (left
panel) and for workers employed in industries with a coverage rate by collective wage agreements of less
than 50% (right panel).
growth of gross wages per year separately by treatment and control group. For both
samples, the two lines clearly exhibit a common trend. Both results refute the suspicion
of systematic differences in growth rates between the treatment and control group and
support the notion that the additional wage growth found in column (3) can indeed be
attributed to wage compensation paid to workers who have incurred net wage losses as
a result of the reform.
Understanding the magnitude of these wage compensations relative to the net wage
losses allows for drawing inference on how commuting costs are distributed between
workers and firms. Given average gross wages of 29,971 Euro for workers unbound by
collective wage agreements, the results in column (3) imply an average rise in gross wages
due to compensatory wage payments of 24 Euro. With average marginal tax rates of
19.3%, this yields a positive net wage adjustment of 19 Euro. The average size of net
wage losses as a consequence of the reform amounts on average to 241 Euro per year.
Taken together, these numbers suggest that workers are compensated for eight percent
of the additional commuting costs they effectively incur as a result of the reform.
In the remaining columns of Table 4.2, we address a number of issues that pose a po-
tential threat to a proper identification of compensatory wage payments. Throughout
all specifications we use gross wage growth as dependent variable.
First, so far we have merged all workers negatively affected by the reform into one
treatment group. As Figure 4.4 illustrates, the reform has, however, brought forth two
groups of treated workers who are affected differently by the reform. The first group
consists of workers commuting between 14 and 33km, who deduct the lump-sum after
the reform instead of the per-kilometer amount they have claimed before. The second
group comprises workers commuting 34km or more to work. In order to examine po-
tential differences in wage compensations paid to either group, we estimate the size of
66
Chapter 4. Commuting Subsidies
Figure 4.4: Illustration of Robustness Checks
Tax Break in Euro
920
4500
Control Treat 1 Treat 2
14km 34km 67km 87km
Distance
Pre Reform Post Reform
Note: 920 Euro denotes the lump-sum deduction. 4500 Euro is the maximum amount deductible per
year when using public transportation, which translates into an upper bound of 67 (87)km, above which
workers cannot deduct commuting expenses in the pre- (post-)reform regime. The figure also illustrates
the differentiation between two groups of treated workers, which we address in the first robustness check.
the treatment effect separately for each of the two groups. Equation (4.3) contains the
augmented specification with two treatment groups:
∆log(grosswage)it = α + λdt + δ1(T1 × d)it + δ2(T2 × d)it+X′itβ1 +Z′itβ2 + µi + εit (4.3)
As shown in column (4), the treatment effect is positive and significant for the first group
and does not change in size compared to using one treatment group. In contrast, while
the coefficient for the second treatment group also remains constant in size, it is not
significant. Given the larger standard errors with otherwise unchanged point estimates,
this insignificance might be caused by a loss of statistical precision of the estimates.
Since, however, the sample size is about the same for both treatment groups (1.7 mil-
lion in each group), the estimate more likely indicates that workers commuting larger
distances are not compensated financially, potentially because their loss in subsidies is
smaller in relative terms compared to the first treatment group. Importantly, the re-
sults show that the compensatory wage effects we find are not driven by workers with
‘extreme’ commuting distances, but rather by workers with medium distances between
home and work.
Second, tax legislation stipulates an upper limit of 4,500 Euro for the deduction of
commuting costs incurred from the use of public transportation. In Germany, 13 per-
cent of workers regularly commute to work by metro, bus, light rail, or train (Breiholz
et al., 2005). These workers can offset commuting costs against tax only below an upper
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threshold of 67km before and 87km after the reform.11 As illustrated in Figure 4.4,
this introduces another (shifting) kink into the distribution of tax breaks. Effectively,
this means that workers commuting more than 87km by means of public transport (e.g.,
by using transregional or high-speed trains) have no incentive to negotiate for higher
gross wages as they are de facto not affected by the reform. In order to test whether
the existence of this upper ceiling affects our results, we apply a maximum commuting
distance of 87km and drop all observations above this threshold. As shown in column
(5), this restriction does not change the results.
Third, workers may be compensated by means of non-wage benefits like company cars
or tickets for public transportation. Representative survey data from the German Socio-
Economic Panel (DIW (2013)) suggest that five percent of workers receive benefits of
a kind that is relevant in this context, like the provision of a company car or the par-
tial coverage of travel expenses. In our wage data, these types of compensation are
not observable as they are not subject to social security contributions. We therefore
address this issue indirectly by excluding those workers with the highest propensity to
be compensated by means of non-wage benefits. According to Shiftan et al. (2012) and
Gutie´rrez-i Puigarnau and van Ommeren (2011), personal income is the most defin-
ing characteristic for the use of company cars. In fact, two thirds of all company cars
are provided to workers in the upper quintile of the wage distribution. We lower this
threshold to the upper quartile and drop all workers with annual gross wages of more
than 39,690 Euro (75th percentile) in 2006. The results are contained in column (6).
The coefficient rises from 0.0008 to 0.0009, supporting the notion that additional wage
payments are partially substituted by non-wage compensations.
Fourth, we address the concern that if workers offset other income-related expenses
against tax, this effectively lowers the threshold of commuting distances above which
workers claim the per-kilometer rather than the lump-sum option. With an average of
60 percent, commuting expenses make up by far the biggest share of all work-related
expenses (Destatis, 2013b). The next most relevant items are in decreasing order ex-
penditures for work equipment (6.7%), double household allowances (5.4%), additional
meal allowance (4.9%), job-related travel expenses (4.5%), contributions to professional
associations (2.3%), and costs for home office (1.6%). Each of these items is by itself
of minor importance and cannot be systematically attributed to single worker groups.
This inhibits excluding particular groups of workers with a high incidence of other types
of income-related expenses from the sample. We can, however, exploit the fact that
the share of commuting costs (60%) is constant across all wage groups contained in our
sample (Destatis, 2013b) as this allows to lower the threshold between treatment and
11The threshold of 67km for the pre-reform period is obtained from the formula for determining the
individual deductible amount: 223*0.30*Distance=4,500. The reform effectively shifts this threshold up
to 87km since the first 20km are not deductible anymore.
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control group to 9 kilometers and to re-estimate equation (4.2) with the two groups
defined accordingly.12 This approach, however, comes at the cost of a potential under-
estimation of compensatory wage effects because a number of untreated workers will
now mistakenly be classified as treated. Given this caveat, the slightly lower but highly
significant point estimate of 0.0005 obtained in column (7) provides a lower bound for
the size of compensatory wage payments.
Another concern is that workers potentially overreport their commuting distance to tax
authorities with the intent to reduce their taxable income. For a number of reasons,
such overreporting is unlikely to be a problem in the present context. The literature on
bunching finds evidence for a systematic manipulation of tax files only at large kinks in
the tax schedule and only for the self-employed (Saez (2010), Bastani and Selin (2014)).
Since marginal tax rates are not clustered in brackets in the German tax schedule (Doer-
renberg et al. (forthcoming)) and because self-employed are not contained in our data set,
the occurrence of overreporting at particular points in the wage distribution is unlikely.
In addition, unlike the Austrian system, for which overreporting has been found (see
Paetzold and Winner (2014)), the German regulation on commuting subsidies does not
contain salient points which encourage manipulation (see Figure 4.1). Furthermore, the
distribution of commuting distances calculated from our data is similar to self-reported
distances contained in the German Socio-Economic Panel (Pfaff (2013)). Finally, since
any overreporting of commuting distances effectively lowers the threshold between treat-
ment and control group, we have indirectly controlled for this in the prior robustness
check, where we have reduced the threshold above which the per-kilometer deduction
can be claimed.
Finally, urban economic theory predicts changes in commuting costs to capitalize in
housing prices (Borck and Wrede (2005, 2009)). This idea is not at odds with the
empirical results obtained so far. It rather implies that wage losses as well as wage
compensations are passed on to land owners. A causal analysis of how housing prices
adjust to changes in individual net wages is beyond the scope of this paper. Since we
are, however, concerned with the distributional effects of commuting subsidies, we briefly
address the question whether there is descriptive evidence that the subsidy benefits land
owners rather than workers. In order to test this presumption one would ideally examine
whether housing prices decrease for workers negatively affected by the reform. Unfortu-
nately, it is not possible to merge information on individual housing prices to the IEB
data. However, we can calculate the average commuting distance for each region from
the worker data and examine whether average regional housing prices change with com-
muting distances before and after the reform. As an alternative approach, we exploit
12Reducing the lump-sum of 920 Euros by 40 percent leads to a critical value of 552 Euro above which
workers claim the per-kilometer deduction. Solving the formula 223*0.30*Distance=552 for Distance
yields a threshold of 9km for full-time workers.
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the fact that in our sample the average commuting distance of workers living in cities
(11.6 kilometers) is about 25 percent smaller than that of workers living in rural areas
(15.6 kilometers). Since net wage losses are larger for the latter group (see Section 4.5),
we should see housing prices rise more in cities than in rural areas in the years after the
reform. We implement both approaches in the following DID model:
∆log(landprice)rt = γ + ρdt + θ(C × d)rt + νr + ηrt (4.4)
The dependent variable is the growth of average selling prices for ready-for-building land
in region r in year t. As before, dt denotes pre- and post-reform periods. Depending
on the approach, C measures the average commuting distance of all workers living in
region r or, alternatively, is a dummy variable indicating whether a county (NUTS III)
is classified as urban (Kreisfreie Stadt) or rural (Landkreis). In 2006 and 2007, 295
rural regions existed, which contained about 65 percent of the population, alongside 107
cities. νr denotes region-fixed effects. Drawing on data provided by the Federal Statisti-
cal Office on average prices per square meter of sold land per county (Destatis (2013a)),
we estimate equation (4.4) separately for both indicators. The results are contained in
Table (4.3). As indicated by the insignificant interaction effects, for none of the specifi-
cations we find evidence for a shift in the growth path of regional land prices after the
reform. Although this finding can be caused by the small scale of compensation effects
or by the sluggish adjustment of land prices, it suggests that the redistributive effects
of the reform are not passed on to land owners but are largely borne by workers.
In sum, the robustness checks confirm the finding of small but significant wage com-
pensations paid to workers who are negatively affected by the reform and who can
individually negotiate their wage. These workers are compensated on average for eight
percent of the net wage loss they incur from the reduction of commuting subsidies.
These findings suggest that the costs from a partial repeal of commuting subsidies have
mainly been borne by workers commuting 14km or more to work, in particular if they
are covered by collective wage agreements. More generally, the results can be taken as
evidence that workers are only imperfectly compensated for commuting costs by their
employers.
4.5 The Distribution of Tax Savings across Worker Groups
If commuting subsidies are largely inspired by equity considerations it is of interest to
examine how benefits are distributed between different worker groups. We now address
this question by calculating the amount of tax savings, i.e., of individual net wage effects
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Table 4.3: Capitalization of Commuting Subsidies in Land Prices
Dependent Variable ∆ log(Price Sold Land)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Average Comm. Distance .003
(.0017)
City -.014
(.0113)
Post .031 .030 -.048 -.054***
(.0359) (.0373) (.0139) (.0146)
Av. Comm. Dist.*Post -.004 -.004
(.0029) (.0031)
City*Post .005 .011
(.0276) (.0281)
Region Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes
Mean Dep. Var. .0122
Years 1996 - 2008
N 4,637
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗/∗∗/∗∗∗indicate significance at the 5%/1%/0.1% level, re-
spectively. Independent variables: City=1 for counties classified as urban (Kreisfreie Stadt).
Average Commuting Distance is the mean commuting distance of all workers living within a
county. Post=1 in 2007 and 2008, when the policy was in effect.
from the tax break, for each worker before and after the reform. We then examine the
distribution of these tax savings between workers along two dimensions.
First, we consider to which extent commuting subsidies are regressive in nature by ef-
fectively attenuating the progression of marginal tax rates (Biewen and Juhasz (2012)).
While it is ex ante likely that commuting subsidies benefit in particular workers with
high wages as these are subject to higher marginal tax rates and on average commute
longer distances, the specific distribution of tax savings between different income groups
has so far remained unclear.
Second, commuting subsidies might exhibit a spatial component if they benefit workers
in different regions to a different extent. A natural presumption would be that workers
in rural areas incur larger net wage effects from tax breaks on commuting because they
commute on average longer distances. This effect might, however, be counteracted by
lower wages and correspondingly lower marginal tax rates in rural areas. Given the
predominantly rural structure and comparatively low wages in East Germany, it is of
particular interest with respect to the German case to examine whether workers in this
part of the country benefit more or less than proportional from commuting subsidies.
We examine the income and the spatial dimension of tax savings from commuting subsi-
dies in turn. Methodologically, we first calculate the average size of deductible amounts
and of tax savings by worker group before and after the reform (we describe the ex-
act procedure in Appendix C). We plot both against gross wages and against regional
density in order to shed light on how their respective distribution has changed with the
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Figure 4.5: Tax Deductions Before and After the Reform, by Gross Wage
Note: The figure shows average absolute deductions (left panel) and deductions relative to gross wage
(right panel) before and after the reform in gross wage bins of 2,000 Euro in the range from 12,000 to
62,000 Euro. The kernel density shows the distribution of workers by gross wage.
reform. Regarding the spatial dimension, we then compute Theil indices (defined in Sec-
tion 4.5.2) in order to disentangle whether changes in the distribution of benefits result
from changes within or between region types. We use the same data as described in 4.3.1.
4.5.1 Distribution between Wage Groups
Figure 4.5 contains the distribution of average deductible amounts by gross wage groups
in gross wage bins from 12,000 to 62,000 Euro in steps of 2,000 Euro before and after the
reform.13 The kernel density of workers relates the distribution of deductible amounts
to the number of workers affected.
The left panel shows the distribution of deductible amounts in absolute values, which
increases with gross wage for both years. Before the reform, the sum of commuting costs
that workers could offset against tax rises from an average of 1,400 Euro for workers
earning 12,000 Euro per year to 2,500 Euro for workers in the 62,000 Euro bracket. Since
the size of the deductible amount is independent of marginal tax rates, this distribu-
tion mirrors the fact that average commuting distances rise with gross wage. After the
reform, the average deductible amount rises only moderately from 1,000 to 1,500 Euro
along the distribution. With an average difference of 300 Euro for workers at the lower
end of the distribution and of 1,000 Euro for workers at the upper end, the size of the
loss increases in absolute values with gross wage.
The right panel shows the average deductible amount relative to gross wage within each
13The upper bound is the maximum threshold for social security contributions above which wages are
censored in the data. The lower bound results from the fact that income taxation applies to all taxable
incomes exceeding a minimum of 7,664 Euro. For workers with annual wages of 12,000 Euro and below,
income taxes are effectively zero because numerous deduction possibilities reduce taxable incomes to
below this threshold.
72
Chapter 4. Commuting Subsidies
Figure 4.6: Tax Savings Before and After the Reform, by Gross Wage
Note: The figure shows average absolute (left panel) and relative (right panel) tax savings before and
after the reform in gross-wage bins of 2,000 Euro in the range of gross-wages from 12,000 to 62,000 Euro.
The kernel density indicates the distribution of workers by gross wage.
bin, calculated as 1n ∑ni deductible amountigrosswagei for the n individuals in each wage category. In
contrast to the absolute values shown in the left panel, the relative importance of the de-
duction is largest for low-wage workers. In fact, workers earning 12,000 Euro can reduce
their taxable income by 13% before the reform, while the corresponding value for the
highest wage category is only 4.1%. The reform yields a parallel downward shift of the
curve, leading to a reduction of deductible amounts between two and three percentage
points for all worker groups.
In the left panel of Figure 4.6, we plot tax savings from tax breaks on commuting costs
in absolute values against gross wage. Over the full range of gross wages, tax savings
increase monotonically from zero to about 700 Euro per year. The right panel displays
tax savings as a share of gross wage. It turns out that relative to their gross wage, lower
wage groups profit least from commuting subsidies. Tax savings rise steeply up to a
gross wage level of about 23,000 Euro and become flat thereafter at a share between
0.9 and 1.1% of gross income. With the reform, tax savings remain virtually unchanged
for workers earning less than 20,000 Euro annually. In contrast, the decrease for higher
wage groups is more pronounced. This is due to the combined fact that workers with
higher gross wages commute longer distances and are subject to higher marginal tax
rates due to progressive taxation. As a result, with a reduction from 1.1% to 0.6% of
gross wage, the net wage effect of commuting subsidies for these wage groups has about
halved.
Overall, the analysis shows that the regime of commuting subsidies prevailing before
the reform was unambiguously regressive in nature inasmuch as it has reduced the tax
burden predominantly for higher wage groups. The introduction of a lower bound on
commuting distances combined with the option to deduct a lump-sum has led to a more
equal distribution of tax savings by disadvantaging higher incomes while leaving lower
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incomes largely unaffected.
4.5.2 Distribution between Regions
From a spatial perspective, it is of interest to see whether regional differences exist with
regard to the distribution of net wage benefits from commuting subsidies and how the
reform has affected this distribution. Specific to the German case, this is particularly
relevant with respect to disparities between East and West Germany. Wage levels in
the former East are still substantially lower than in the West, unemployment is higher
and commuting distances are larger due to the rural nature of most areas. We therefore
examine whether urban and rural regions, as well East and West Germany differ with
respect to the distribution of tax savings before and after the reform.
In Figure 4.7, we plot the distribution of deductible amounts and of tax savings against
logged regional population density in bins of 20 log points. Density is measured as res-
idential population per square kilometer within each of the 403 NUTS III regions in
Germany. Over the whole range of population density, the average deductible amount
falls from 2,500 Euro in counties with a population density of 45 workers per square
kilometer to 1,450 Euro in counties with a density of 3,846 workers per km2, reflecting
the fact that commuting distances decrease with the degree of urbanization. The outlier
on the rightmost extreme of the distribution represents Berlin. The average deductible
amount is higher for Berlin compared to other core cities because the substantial spread
of the city entails larger commuting distances. With the reform, deductible amounts
decline most strongly for workers in rural areas, where losses on average amount to 900
Euro compared to 330 Euro in urban areas (excluding Berlin).
The right panel contains the corresponding distribution for tax savings. The negative
slope is less pronounced compared to deductible amounts because larger commuting dis-
tances in rural areas are countervailed by higher gross wages and correspondingly higher
marginal tax rates in urban areas. While tax savings were declining modestly with pop-
ulation density in the middle part of the distribution, the reform has virtually equalized
the distribution of tax savings across regions. While tax savings ranged between 250
and 350 Euro in 2006, they turn out largely constant at around 220 Euro in 2007.
Theoretically, the observed reduction in inequality can result from changes in the distri-
bution of tax savings within or between region types. We address this issue by means
of the Theil index. As a key advantage, the index can be decomposed into K subgroups
when mutually exclusive and exhaustive subgroups are considered (see, e.g., Shorrocks
(1980)) and Morduch and Sicular (2002)). The Theil index and its decomposition are
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Figure 4.7: Tax Deductions and Tax Savings Before and After the Reform, by Re-
gional Density
Note: The figure shows average deductible amounts (left panel) and tax savings (right panel) before and
after the reform by population density in bins of 20 log points for population densities within German
(NUTS III) regions.
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where yi denotes tax savings for individual i and y¯ the mean of y for all n individuals.
The index ranges between 0 and ∞, where a value of 0 indicates an equal distribution.
The right hand side of equation (4.5) decomposes the index into a “within”- and a
“between”-component. Tk represents the Theil index for subgroup k, i.e., for urban and
rural workers or for workers in East or West Germany. Y and Yk denote the sum of tax
savings in the total population and within subgroup k, respectively.
For the decomposition to be meaningful, we need to classify regions into rural and urban
regions. As in Section 4.4.2, we employ the categorization of German NUTS III regions
into cities (Kreisfreie Sta¨dte) and counties (Landkreise).
The first row in Table 4.4 provides the Theil index for the distribution of tax savings in
Germany separately by pre- and post-reform period. With a reduction of inequality by
30 percent, the impact of the reform has been substantial. The two lower panels shed
light on how this overall decrease can be attributed to changes in the distribution of
tax savings within and between rural and urban areas on the one hand, and within and
between East and West Germany on the other hand.
The first two rows in the second panel contain the Theil indices separately for urban
and rural areas. The distribution of tax savings is less equal in rural regions compared
to urban regions and has decreased less with the reform compared to urban areas. When
decomposing overall inequality into its within- and between-components, it turns out
that inequality is nearly completely driven by the within-component. The between-
component only adds about one percent to overall inequality, indicating that there are
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Table 4.4: Decomposition of Theil Index of Tax Savings, by Region Type
2004-2006 2007-2008 ∆
All Germany 0.3627 0.2572 -0.106
Urban only 0.3261 0.2068 -0.119
Rural only 0.3672 0.2736 -0.094
Decomposition
Within 0.3577 0.2561 -0.102
Between 0.0050 0.0007 -0.004
Percentage of w/i 0.99 0.99
East only 0.4058 0.3237 -0.082
West only 0.3512 0.2427 -0.109
Decomposition
Within 0.3589 0.2149 -0.144
Between 0.0038 0.0023 -0.002
Percentage of w/i 0.99 0.99
hardly any systematic differences between both region types. The reform has no effect
on this pattern. A decomposition by East and West Germany in the third block yields
largely the same picture. Tax savings are less equally distributed in the (mostly rural)
regions in East Germany as compared to the West and this inequality has decreased
less with the reform. Again, the between-component does not play a role regarding an
unequal distribution of tax savings between workers.
Overall, the results indicate that the introduction of a lower bound on commuting dis-
tances combined with the option to deduct a lump-sum has led to a more equal dis-
tribution of tax savings with respect to the two dimensions considered. Regarding the
distribution among wage groups, the new regime has equalized the distribution of tax
savings relative to gross wages for workers with annual gross wages above 20,000 Euro,
while leaving tax savings of lower wage groups unaffected. As such, the reform has
reduced the regressive tax effect of commuting subsidies. Similarly, the new regime has
led to a decrease of inequality in the distribution of tax savings across region types.
The results from the Theil index suggest that the reform has reduced inequality within
urban and rural regions, as well as within East and West Germany by about 30%. From
a political view point, this latter point is particularly interesting because differences in
population densities between East and West as well as between rural and urban areas
have often been pointed out as reasons for the design of commuting subsidies before the
reform (see, e.g., Bundesministerium der Finanzen (2010)).
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4.6 Discussion
In this paper we examine the distributional effects of commuting subsidies along three
dimensions. Employing a difference-in-differences approach, we first estimate whether
workers are compensated by their employers for the net wage losses they incur as a result
of large-scale reductions in commuting subsidies. The results show no indication of gross
wage adjustments for the full sample of workers. Only for workers largely uncovered by
collective wage agreements we find evidence for wage compensations in the magnitude
of 8% of the net wage losses that workers have incurred from the partial repeal of com-
muting subsidies. These results support the notion that the bulk of commuting costs
are borne by workers rather than firms.
In the second part of the paper, we analyze whether commuting subsidies are progressive
or regressive in nature and how tax savings are distributed between region types. The
results show that the benefits from commuting subsidies accrue more than proportion-
ally to workers with higher wages. The introduction of a lower bound on commuting
distances has reduced the size of these net wage benefits mainly for workers with annual
wages above 20,000 Euro annually while leaving workers in lower wage groups unaffected.
Regarding the distribution of tax savings from commuting subsidies between regions, we
find that workers in rural regions benefit more than proportionally in terms of their net
wages. The reform has largely equalized the distribution of tax savings between urban
and rural areas and between East and West Germany.
Beyond their significance for the German case, these results are instructive for the de-
sign of commuting subsidies in general because they allow to compare the distributional
effect of two regimes within an otherwise stable macroeconomic environment. Overall,
the introduction of a lower bound for commuting distances, as it is currently practiced
in Sweden, Denmark, and Austria, has the potential to substantially reduce the amount
of foregone tax revenues from tax breaks on commuting costs while at the same time
yielding a more equitable distribution of tax saving between wage groups and across
regions. Interestingly, despite these effects no new reform attempt has been made in
Germany after the ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court in 2008.
The recent availability of geo-referenced data provides ample opportunities for more
extensive research in this area. An important aspect not covered sufficiently in the
empirical literature relates to modal choice and, hence, to the environmental dimen-
sion of commuting subsidies. Specifically, whether commuting subsidies should pro-
vide incentives to use public instead of private transportation crucially depends on the
worker-specific availability of public transport and on the demand elasticities. Combin-
ing large-scale information on public transportation schedules and on travel times with
precise geographic information on worker location is well suited to shed light on potential
efficiency as well as equity effects from transportation-specific financial incentives.
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Conclusion
My thesis discusses several spatial aspects of the labor market and thereby analyzes the
interplay of individuals’ location and their labor market outcomes.
I examine the relationship of residential segregation and wages in chapter 2 and neigh-
borhood referral effects in chapter 3. In the light of the current European and especially
German refugee crisis1, questions concerning urban policies and the refugees’ integra-
tion into the labor market are more prevelant than ever. Should segregation in cities be
tolerated or even encouraged such that networks can emerge? Should new migrants be
integrated and “forced” into predominantly German neighborhoods? Although chapter
2 and 3 emphasize the importance of proximity of “similar” neighbors in finding a job,
these results are based on comparatively moderate numbers of migrants and especially
migrant concentration. Ha¨ußermann et al. (2008) outline the historic development of
German segregation which used to be characterized by a policy of assignment (controlled
by specific quarters of accommodation for guest-workers) and discrimination. Nowadays
especially middle class migrants can choose their residential location more freely. As
now the neighborhood composition is mostly regulated by the market, this again leads
to a reinforcement of impoverishment in certain areas. Everyone who can afford to move
away will do so.
In Germany’s current situation, the stream of incoming refugees is a challenge to all
urban development and local authorities. Especially new migrants have an incentive
to settle close to their fellow countrymen, because of language and cultural barriers. If
those groups are mostly unqualified (or their qualification is not acknowledged), this can
have serious consequences for urban landscapes. Both segregation - the topic of chapter
2 - and residential based networks - the topic of chapter 3 - are therefore more relevant
than ever in the German political debate. Although chapter 2 suffers from specification
1In 2015, Germany received almost 500,000 applications for asylum (which does not include all the
unprocessed applications). This is equivalent to an increase of 235% compared to 2014. (BAMF, 2016)
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and data problems, it highlights an important political issue. Chapter 3 addresses some
of the most important shortcomings of the prior chapter, namely sorting and the speci-
fication of residential neighborhoods. Even if we find robust evidence for the existence
of neighborhood effects it is unclear which policy would be appropriate.
Prominent examples of policies targeting this interdependence are relocation programs
such as the Gartreux in Chicago in the 1970s or the Moving to Opportunity (MTO)
program, which was conducted in Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles and New
York in the 1990s (see e.g. Ludwig et al. (2008), Ludwig et al. (2013)). Low-income
families with children who lived in public housing projects could voluntarily apply to
participate in the program and were then randomly assigned to one of three groups:
The first group received housing vouchers for low-poverty neighborhoods together with
counselling for housing, the second group only received housing vouchers (also for neigh-
borhoods with low poverty levels). The third group did not receive anything (serving
as a control group). Albeit the extent of the program, the economic improvements of
participants were lower than expected. There were no significant effects for economic
or health improvements for adults, and only minor health improvements for youths four
to seven years after the intervention (Goering and Feins, 2003). Long-run effects show
that even though there are neither educational, employment or income effects, the policy
positively affected people’s health both for young and adult participants (Sanbonmatsu
et al., 2011). Pettit and McLanahan (2003) qualitatively analyze the effectiveness of
the program. They survey MTO participants’ social connections in their old and new
neighborhoods in Los Angeles. They find a higher degree of isolation especially for
adult participants in low-poverty neighborhoods. This qualitative evidence illustrates
the importance of social networks within neighborhoods, which emphasizes how external
neighborhood effects can be undermined when those relocated choose their own peers.
As the difference between the new and the old environment was intended to be substan-
tial, social isolation and retaining to old (and presumably less valuable) contacts were
the consequence. Information flows and local networks - as in chapter 3 - may therefore
not be accessible for those who moved. Over all, empirical findings suggest that policies
directed to improve economic opportunities in impoverished areas are more likely to be
effective than mobility policies (Ross and Zenou, 2008). So targeting job training or
other active labor market policies directly to neighborhoods with low income or high
unemployment rates may be the better policy than to relocate impoverished families
into better neighborhoods. In this way, the social networks stay intact such that new
job information can be distributed most efficiently, this may be beneficial for an even
higher proportion as those actually targeted by the policy.
All in all, the results of urban and relocation policies to improve economic opportunities
by relocation or reorganizing the housing environment seem to have failed. The evidence
from network studies and public housing experiments suggests, that people benefit the
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most from mixed income communities.
To target disadvantaged areas with e.g. labor market policies, it is important to quan-
tify the effect of residential location on personal outcomes as accurately as possible.
Although chapter 3 overcomes some of the problems from chapter 2, there are still some
critiques left. The main problem in chapter 3 is the lack of information on people’s
social interaction. Our measure of a network effect is only a proxy which has to be in-
terpreted with caution. Topa (2011) suggests that residential neighborhoods contain the
natural requirements for social interactions. They minimize costs of interaction, as they
constitute of a physically proximate space. Moreover, they usually contain public places
and potential meeting points like public schools, sports clubs, churches etc. where social
interaction predominantly takes place. Nevertheless, as our data set consists of registry
data, there is no information on actual interactions. As the data has many advantages
(like its size, accuracy and scope of reliable information, described in section 3.3) I be-
lieve the approximation is a drawback that has to be accepted in order to measure local
spillovers.
We make a great effort to address all potential confounders, but we cannot completely
rule out all potential spurious correlation. Missing household information is one ex-
ample of another data issue which can lead to spurious correlation. Especially small
and medium size firms in Germany are largely dominated by family owned businesses.
Although we exclude females in our regressions estimating firm size effects and see no
differences here, it could still be the case that e.g. fathers and sons work dispropor-
tionately often together in the same establishment (e.g. family businesses of craftsmen
or retail etc.), which would not be excluded in this particular robustness check. When
fathers and sons live in the same neighborhood and work in the same family business,
the likelihood of working together when living together is increased although there is no
connection to informal job markets whatsoever.
In chapter 4, I analyze distributional effects of commuting subsidies. On the one hand,
we test to what extent employers compensate workers in the absence of governmental
commuting subsidies. We thereby analyze the distributional effects between workers and
firms. On the other hand, we investigate the distributional effects of the policy change
between worker groups as well as rural and urban workers.
We use a unique reform on the tax breaks on commuting in Germany in combination
with a large geo-coded registry data set. Using the partial abolishment of commuting
subsidies in Germany in 2007, where only commuting costs from 20km onwards were
deductible, we employ a difference-in-differences strategy to estimate gross wage com-
pensations for those affected by the policy. We find that in the full data set, workers
experience no changes in gross wages as a reaction to the policy and small but significant
and robust effects for workers largely uncovered by collective wage agreements. The lat-
ter group is compensated by 8% of their net wage losses. The largest part of tax burdens
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in consequence of the reduction in subsidies is hence carried by workers. In the second
part of the paper, we analyze how the benefits of commuting subsidies are distributed
between groups of workers in the two subsequent regimes. It turns out that commuting
subsidies prevailing before 2007 (which are the same as today) are clearly regressive
in nature. The reform of 2007 which introduced a lower bound to the deductibility of
commuting costs then led to a more equal distribution of tax savings across gross wages.
In addition, the lower bound also inherently eliminates the differential benefits between
urban and rural areas as well as between East and West. Further, and although beyond
the scope of this particular research, subsidizing commuting from the first kilometer
onwards has negative effects on environmental pollution (see also Bach (2007)). Inter-
national comparison further affirms the interpretation that commuting subsidies should
be capped at a maximum length and also encourage people to use public transportation
instead of own cars2. Although we do not observe changes in residential location as a
reaction to the cutback of commuting subsidies (which is both due to data restrictions
and the limited time the altered policy was in effect), the current rule has the unin-
tended side-effect of urban sprawl.3 Instead, decision makers should use this means of
influencing people’s spatial distribution among space, which would benefit environmen-
tal and infrastructural goals. Moreover, people could benefit from social interactions
and spillovers as mentioned in chapters 2 and 3.
In summary, I provide the following research contributions: First, I show that the correla-
tion of migrants’ individual wages and their concentration in residential neighborhoods is
non-negative. Second, I provide credible evidence that there exist informal labor market
networks based on residential locations, which are especially important for low qualified
and minority workers. Third, I show that German workers are only compensated to a
small extent in the absence of commuting subsidies. Additionally, designing commuting
subsidies as a lump-sum deduction together with a lower bound on per-kilometer de-
duction leads to a more equal distribution of tax savings as opposed to without a lower
bound.
2Tax legislation foresees an upper limit of 4,500 Euro if people commute with public transportation
whereas there is no limit if people use their own or company cars.
3As Brueckner (2005) shows, commuting subsidies in general drive urban sprawl.
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Appendix A
Appendix Residential Segregation
of Immigrants in Germany
District German Foreigner
Hamburg city 939 130
87.84% 12.16%
HH Altona 1,005 106
90.46% 9.54%
HH Bergdorf 536 24
95.91% 4.09%
HH Nord 1,535 91
94.40% 5.60%
HH Wandsbek 1,679 92
94.81% 5.19%
HH Eimsbu¨ttel 1,182 87
93.14% 6.86%
HH Harburg 789 104
Table A.1: Classification of Foreigner Types
Foreigner type 1 (F1) Foreigner type 2 (F2)
Switzerland, France, Austria, Nether-
lands, Luxembourg, Belgium, GB, Den-
mark, Sweden, Finland, USA, Canada,
Australia
Turkey, Italy, Greece, Poland, Croa-
tia, Portugal, Spain, Russia, Ruma-
nia, Czech Republic, Ukraine, Hun-
gary, Albania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Esto-
nia, Latvia, Lithuania, Rest of Europe,
Ethiopia, Ghana, Morocco, Tunisia,
Rest of Africa, Rest of America, India,
Iraq, Iran, Thailand, Rest of Asia
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88.35% 11.65%
Frankfurt/ M. 2,654 600
81.56% 18.44%
FfM Bad Homburg 1,140 103
91.71% 8.29%
FfM Bad Vilbel 335 29
92.03% 7.97%
FfM Ho¨chst 1,561 249
82.24% 13.76%
Langen 492 43
91.96% 8.94%
Stuttgart City 912 247
78.69% 21.31%
Bo¨blingen 1,183 206
85.16% 14.84%
Herrenberg 480 51
90.21% 9.79%
Leonberg 527 74
87.69% 12.31%
Stuttgart-Vaiblingen 686 92
88.17% 11.83%
Stuttgart-Feuerbach 459 148
75.26% 24.74%
Bad Cannstatt 626 181
77.57% 24.38%
Munich City 7,929 1,562
83.54% 16.46%
Dachau 883 68
92.54% 7.36%
Ebersberg 727 55
92.97% 7.03%
Fu¨rstenfeldbruck 1,157 84
93.23% 6.77%
Starnberg 591 59
90.29% 9.71%
Southern Berlin 857 85
90.98% 9.02%
Treptow-Ko¨penik 1,04x <20>98% <2%
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Steglitz-Zehlendorf 820 100
89.13% 10.07%
Tempelhof-
Scho¨neberg
1,121 232
82.83% 17.17%
Northern Berlin 1,073 97
91.71% 8.29%
Pankow 1,702 38
91.71% 2.18%
Spandau 842 35
95.93% 4.07%
Berlin Mitte 882 82
91.49% 8.51%
Mu¨llerstrasse 1,059 122
89.98% 10.02%
Lichtenberg 1,380 28
98.01% 1.99%
Marzahn-Hellersdorf >1,530 ¡20>99% <1%
Reinickendorf 805 50
94.15% 5.85%
Overall 43,337 5,163
89.35% 10.65%
87
Appendix A. Appendix A
Table A.2: Foreigners’ Nationalities conducted from BAP, wave 40
Nationality number percentage
Turkey 921 17.84
Italy 500 9.68
Form. Jugoslavia 372 7.21
Greece 288 5.58
France 133 2.58
Poland 160 3.10
Austria 254 4.92
Croatia 415 8.04
Portugal 116 2.25
Spain 95 1.84
Netherlands/ Luxembourg 53 1.03
Russia 98 1.90
Bosnia-Herzegovina 201 3.90
Great Britain/ Ireland 91 1.76
Czech Republic/ Slovakia 52 1.01
Ukraine 63 1.22
Macedonia 60 1.16
USA/ Canada 87 1.69
Afghanistan 85 1.64
Iran 117 2.27
Rest 1002 19.41
Only countries with more than 50 individuals living in
Germany are listed in this table.
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Table B.2: Estimation of Heterogenous Referral Effects, Full Output
Refferal to neighborhood (a = n) Refferal to firm (a = f)
Variable (2) (3) (2) (3)
Constant 2.2207∗∗∗ 2.0837∗∗∗ .2347∗∗∗ -.1196
(.2998) (.3811) (.1063) (.1054)
Rij .1432
∗∗∗ .1237∗∗∗ .0784∗∗∗ .0605∗∗∗
(.0238) (.0185) (.0241) (.0182)
male -.4281∗∗∗ -.3378∗∗∗ .0266∗∗∗ .2031∗∗∗
(.0322) (.0204) (.0068) (.0094)
male x Rij -.0047 .0457
∗∗∗ -.0065 .0426∗∗∗
(.0205) (.0138) (.0152) (.0076)
Age 15-24 .1423∗∗∗ .4552∗∗∗ -.0300∗∗ .0173
(.0539) (.0550) (.0119) (.0125)
15-24 x Rij .0018 .0482 -.0030 .0738
∗∗∗
(.0298) (.0493) (.0176) (.0263)
Age 25-34 -.1018∗∗∗ -.1012∗∗∗ -.0204∗∗ .0513∗∗∗
(.0381) (.0371) (.0093) (.0161)
25-34 x Rij .0256 .0245 -.0030 .0072
(.0182) (.0264) (.0176) (.0183)
Age 55-65 .2559∗∗∗ .5401∗∗∗ .0471∗∗∗ .1673∗∗∗
(.0414) (.0379) (.0109) (.0119)
55-65 x Rij .0253 .0382 -.0268 .0203
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(.0310) (.0344) (.0109) (.0213)
Unskilled .2130∗∗∗ .7077∗∗∗ .1592∗∗∗ .4913∗∗∗
(.0485) (.0436) (.0117) (.0232)
Uskill x Rij .0106 .1874
∗∗∗ .0136 .1640∗∗∗
(.0224) (.0389) (.0108) (.0283)
Medium Skilled .0335 .1684∗∗∗ .1085∗∗∗ .1859∗∗∗
(.0370) (:0195) (.0069) (.0064)
Mskill x Rij -.0206 .0199 .0122 .0353
∗∗∗
(.0193) (.0158) (.0127) (.0118)
Highskilled -.3452∗∗∗ -.1757∗∗ .0887∗∗∗ .3355∗∗∗
(.0656) (.0806) (.0310) (.0601)
Hskill x Rij .1225 .7734 .1639 .8573
(.1632) (.7215) (.1705) (.7615)
Greek .0714 .6593∗∗ .0544 .6890∗∗∗
(.1938) (.3124) (.0442) (.1534)
Greek x Rij .2102
∗∗ 1.1252∗∗∗ .0544 .9341∗∗∗
(.0924) (.3955) (.0442) (.3205)
Italian .3245∗∗ .8777∗∗∗ .0388 .4942∗∗∗
(.1563) (.2147) (.0508) (.1168)
Italian x Rij .2061 1.3011
∗∗ .2183 .9314∗∗∗
(.2092) (.5590) (.2092) (.2962)
Spanish .4197 .2624 .0565 .5697∗
(.4024) (.5732) (.1050) (.3239)
Spanish x Rij -.1935 1.0928 .0036 .4120
(.1337) (1.0306) (.0508) .7877)
Turkish .1791∗∗ 1.0417∗∗∗ .1543∗∗∗ .9615∗∗∗
(.0793) (.1300) (.0247) (.0911)
Turkish x Rij .0355 .1888 .0392
∗∗ .1672∗∗
(.0404) (.1221) (.0160) (.0677)
Yugoslaviana .1747 .5328∗∗ .0206 .3085∗∗∗
(.1409) (.2055) (.0309) (.0728)
Yugo. x Rij .1214
∗ 1.0888∗∗∗ .0012 .6416∗∗∗
(.0665) (.2647) (.0189) (.1313)
From new EUa -.0339 1.3035∗ -.0571 .3241
(.1657) (.6390) (.0384) (.3214)
New EU x Rij .5642
∗ 23.8789∗∗∗ .4976 23.4559∗∗∗
(.3133) (5.5630) (.3144) (6.9550)
Primary Sector .1152∗ 6.1700∗∗∗ -.2440∗ 5.0837∗∗∗
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(.0697) (.3083) (.0191) (.2351)
PSector x Rij -.0936
∗∗ 1.777∗∗∗ -.0268 1.8385∗∗∗
(.0373) (.3862) (.0373) (.3411)
Construction -.1783∗∗ .6681∗∗∗ -.3861∗∗ .4942∗∗∗
(.0593) (.0993) (.0181) (.1169)
Constr. x Rij -.0293 .7193
∗∗∗ -.0703∗∗ .1385∗∗∗
(.0364) (.1031) (.0215) (.0259)
TTCb .3323∗∗∗ .7939∗∗∗ -.3072∗∗∗ .4300∗∗∗
(.0434) (.0336) (.0173) (.0163)
TTC x Rij -.0493
∗ .2150∗∗∗ -.0661∗ .1827∗∗∗
(.0279) (.0356) (.0205) (.0321)
Buisness Services .3367∗∗∗ 1.1018∗∗∗ .3367∗∗∗ 1.1018∗∗∗
(.0530) (.0563) (.0530) (.0563)
Buisness x Rij -.0996
∗∗∗ .1754∗∗∗ -.0996∗∗∗ .1754∗∗∗
(.0304) (.0404) (.0304) (.0404)
Other Service .6980∗∗∗ 1.7521∗∗∗ -.1078∗∗∗ .8796∗∗∗
(.0120) (.1761) (.0205) (.0307)
Services x Rij -.0171 .03045
∗ .0112 .3091∗
(.0622) (.1761) (.0613) (.1853)
coresize 32.5784 27.6795 -4.3344 -3.9490
(20.6601) (19.6010) (5.4710) (5.4285)
csize x Rij -.0822
∗∗∗ -.0882∗∗∗ -.0500∗∗∗ -.0571∗∗∗
(.0120) (.0124) (.0072) (.0083)
σu 36.6795 31.1610 5.1042 4.6731
σε 13.2821 13.2703 4.7623 4.7485
# pairs 179.7 Mio 179.7 Mio 179.7 Mio 179.7 Mio
# groups 10,159 10,159 10,159 10,159
Corr(u,Xb) -.0042 -.9996 .0249 -.9984
Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses. ∗/∗∗/∗∗∗mark significance at the
90%/95%/99% confidence level. a: Yugoslavian covers immigrants from the territory of former Yu-
goslavia (including Slovenia and Croatia); these are not included in the group of immigrants from new
EU members (which come from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary,
Bulgaria, Romania, Malta and Cyprus).
b: Trade, Transportation and Communication (TTC).
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Figure B.1: Rhein-Ruhr Metropolitan Area
Figure B.2: Size distribution of neighborhoods and super-neighborhoods
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Table B.1: Correlation between individual and average characteristics across neigh-
bors
Within neighborhood Super-neighborhood, without
neighborhood
unconditional cond. on
neighborhood
unconditional cond. on
neighborhood
female 0.4919 0.4920 0.4954 0.4955
male 0.5062 0.5060 0.5050 0.5048
Age 15-24 0.1153 0.1235 0.1101 0.1145
Age 25-34 0.2038 0.2071 0.1949 0.1953
Age 35-54 0.5288 0.5254 0.5266 0.5255
Age 55-65 0.1739 0.1764 0.1720 0.1730
Unskilled 0.1267 0.1340 0.1226 0.1244
Med. skilled 0.3958 0.3913 0.4024 0.4012
Highskilled 0.1182 0.1074 0.1104 0.1014
Unknown skill 0.2611 0.2684 0.2576 0.2618
German 0.8766 0.8731 0.8830 0.8817
Greek 0.0042 -0.0210 0.0062 -0.0229
Italian 0.0082 0.0188 0.0053 -0.0068
Spanish 0.0041 -0.0577 0.0024 -0.0373
Turkish 0.0623 0.1157 0.0481 0.0817
Yugoslaviana 0.0254 0.0626 0.0161 0.0257
From new EUa 0.0159 0.0787 0.0089 0.0336
Other nationality 0.0687 0.0933 0.0538 0.0706
Primary sector 0.0208 0.0177 0.0241 0.0200
Manufacturing 0.1372 0.1349 0.1352 0.1337
Construction 0.0288 0.0283 0.0288 0.0252
TTCb 0.2595 0.2612 0.2604 0.2619
Business Services 0.1672 0.1715 0.1687 0.1706
Other Services 0.2326 0.2287 0.2365 0.2346
a: Yugoslavian covers immigrants from the territory of former Yugoslavia (including Slovenia
and Croatia); these are not included in the group of immigrants from new EU members (which
come from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria,
Romania, Malta and Cyprus).
b: Trade, Transportation and Communication (TTC).
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The Distribution of Commuting
Subsidies
Deriving Individual Deductible Amounts and Tax Savings
from Administrative Data
Drawing on the exact geo-coordinates contained in the IEB data and using ArcGIS,
we first calculate the precise road distance between each worker’s place of living and
place of work. The resulting worker-specific commuting distances allow for determining
individual tax breaks for commuting. We calculate the amount of commuting expenses
that each worker can legally offset against tax according to the following procedure.
For the years 2004 to 2006, we assign the deductible lump-sum of 920 Euro to all workers
commuting less than 14 kilometers per way. For all workers with commuting distances
above this threshold, we calculate the deductible amount as
DeductibleAmount2004−06i = CommutingDistancei × 0.30 × 223 (C.1)
where 0.30 Euro is the deductible amount per kilometer of a one-way commute and 223
is the average number of working days during the period of observation (365 calendar
days - 104 weekend days - 9 public holidays - 29 vacation days (see ?).
After 2007, we apply a threshold of 34 kilometers for the lump-sum deduction. For
distances above this threshold, we use the adjusted formula
DeductibleAmount2007−08i = (CommutingDistancei − 20) × 0.30 × 223 (C.2)
where we account for the fact that commuting costs for the first 20 kilometers cannot
be offset against tax anymore.
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Translating individual deductible amounts into individual tax savings requires infor-
mation on each worker’s marginal tax rate. In order to derive marginal tax rates we
follow the procedure by Gunselmann (2014), to which we add precise information on
commuting distances. Despite some simplifying assumptions required for lack of precise
information, Reichert (2014) shows that net wages calculated from administrative data
using this procedure deviate from net wages contained in representative survey data
(Panel Study Labor Market and Social Security, PASS) by only 6 Euro, suggesting that
the size of measurement error is small.
Daily gross wages, which are contained in the IEB, provide the point of departure.
Multiplying these with the number of calendar days per year yields the annual gross
wage of each worker (see ?). From gross wages, workers can deduct costs for manda-
tory and voluntary insurances (mainly health, pension, and unemployment), for special
expenses (e.g., costs for illness or disability that are not covered by the health insur-
ance and exceed a pre-defined share of individual gross income (one to seven percent,
depending on income and number of children)), and for income related expenses (see
Doerrenberg et al. (forthcoming)). Regarding the first two categories, we deduct the
lump-sums for social insurance contributions (Vorsorgepauschale) and for special ex-
penses (Sonderausgaben-Pauschbetrag) as they are defined in the German Income Tax
Act (Einkommensteuergesetz ). In addition, we offset the worker-specific tax break on
commuting costs we have calculated before.
This procedure yields the individual taxable income, from which individual tax rates
can be determined. In contrast to other national tax systems, the marginal tax rate in
Germany is not clustered in brackets but rises linearly with individual taxable income
(ITI). The tax due T is calculated according to the formula
T =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 for ITI ≤ 7,664(883.7 × ITI−7,66410,000 + 1,500) × ITI−7,66410,000 for 7,664 < ITI ≤ 12,739(228.7 × ITI−12,73910,000 + 2,397) × ITI−12,73910,000 + 989 for 12,739 < ITI ≤ 52,151
0.42 × ITI − 7,914 for 52,151 < ITI ≤ 250,000
0.45 × ITI − 15,414 for ITI > 250,000
The ratio between the tax due T and each worker’s gross wage yields the individual
tax rate. Multiplying this with the individual deductible amount for commuting costs
provides the annual net wage effect that workers incur from the existence of tax breaks
on commuting costs.
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